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ABSTRACT 
 
CHANNELS OF ADJUSTMENT IN LABOR MARKETS: 
THE 2007-2009 FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE 
BY 
TETYANA VOLODYMYRIVNA ZELENSKA 
APRIL 8, 2011 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Bruce Kaufman  
Major Department: Economics 
In the debate on the economic effects of labor market regulation much work has focused 
on minimum wages. A legal minimum wage remains one of the most controversial policy issues. 
The controversy arises for two main reasons: first, there is no consensus over the economic 
impacts of the minimum wage mandate, especially its effect on employment, and, second, there 
is a disagreement over the empirical methods used to identify the minimum wage effects. 
Although the standard competitive model predicts that wage floors should have a negative 
impact on employment, empirical work shows mixed results.  
This dissertation explores a number of adjustment channels that can explain the paradox 
of the small and insignificant employment effects uncovered in the MW literature. Specifically, 
the economic impact of the most recent 2007-2009 Federal minimum wage increase (from $5.15 
to $7.25 an hour) is analyzed using a sample of quick-service restaurants in Georgia and 
Alabama. In contrast to prior studies, store-level bi-weekly payroll records for individual 
employees are used, allowing greater precision in measuring the relative cost-impact of the MW 
on establishments. Despite significant variation in the cost-impact of the three-stage MW 
increase across establishments, regression analysis finds lack of a negative effect on employment 
and hours following each MW increase. Additional channels of adjustment are explored using 
  
xii 
 
unique data from manager surveys. Evidence suggests that higher product prices, lower profit 
margins, wage compression, reduced turnover and higher performance standards largely account 
for insignificant employment effects.  
These results are consistent with a number of alternative theoretical models of labor 
markets. An expanded version of the perfectly competitive model that incorporates additional 
margins of adjustment is also compatible with the reported findings. 
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I. Introduction 
The minimum wage (MW) produces widespread disagreement regarding its effects. 
Some believe it is a counterproductive labor policy because it decreases employment as labor 
cost increases, while others claim that the effect of MW on employment is not clear-cut and that 
the MW helps to reduce poverty. 
 The MW debate has not abated since the establishment of the federal MW law in 1938
1
. 
It has become relevant again following the latest adjustment to the federal MW rates in more 
than a decade (Figure 1): the U.S. federal MW was raised in three $0.70 increments—to $5.85 in 
July, 2007, $6.55 in July, 2008, and to $7.25 in July 2009. 
The controversy over the MW arises due to disagreement between theoretical predictions 
and empirical evidence of the MW effects. The textbook competitive model predicts 
unambiguously lower employment as the cost of labor input rises above the equilibrium level. 
The distortion caused by the ―tax‖ on wages is predicted to cause inefficiency and other 
undesirable outcomes, such as lower profits and slower economic growth in the long run. The 
opposing theoretical paradigm—encompassing a broad class of behavioral, monopsony, Post-
Keynesian and institutional labor market models—generally emphasize positive economic 
effects associated with a higher MW, including greater worker productivity and lower turnover. 
Despite extensive empirical study of the employment effects, little consensus has been reached. 
While panel-based studies using variations in the state and federal MW rates tend to find small 
negative employment elasticities,  a number of ―quasi-experimental‖ case-studies on a sample of 
                                                 
1
 The minimum wage is a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which was passed in 1938. Original 
minimum wage was set to $0.25 per hour and also established standards regarding overtime pay, maximum hours 
worked per week, and child labor. Subsequent increases are passed at the will of Congress as amendments to the 
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low-wage establishments (typically in fast-food or retail sectors) have uncovered small positive 
or insignificant employment effects. 
Lack of theoretical and empirical consensus undermines the ability of policymakers to 
evaluate the implications of the MW policy for public welfare, making it an easy target for 
political controversy. The recent economic recession (2007-2010) has again generated 
considerable criticism of the MW mandate due to the surge in teen unemployment and a sluggish 
national economic recovery. Given a strong commitment among many politicians and interest 
groups to further increases in the MW—to $9.50 an hour and, possibly, indexing it to inflation—
the debate over how MW laws affect labor market outcomes is likely to remain at the forefront 
of policy discussion. Unless we improve our understanding of the economic effects of the MW 
mandate, the welfare implications of this policy will remain obscure. 
The goal of this dissertation is to assemble a comprehensive range of evidence on the 
channels of adjustment to the most recent three-step federal MW increase from $5.15 to $7.25 an 
hour. This research contributes to existing MW literature in several ways. Using unique data on 
individual workers‘ earnings from a sample of quick-service establishments in Georgia and 
Alabama, we are able to exploit the differential cost-impact of the three-stage MW mandate on 
employment and hours worked across establishments located in relatively low- and high-cost 
areas. Importantly, the measure of policy ―treatment‖ is calculated from individual-level payroll 
data which allows capturing the relative cost-impact with greater precision than in prior studies 
that rely on store-level averages (Card & Krueger, 1994). Second, this study goes beyond the 
standard competitive model of labor markets by considering several alternative theoretical 
models which incorporate additional margins of adjustment to the higher labor costs and provide 
an alternative framework for analyzing the MW impact. Third, we examine a range of channels 
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of adjustment using several data sources. In addition to analyzing payroll records, we collect 
unique survey data from the managers to document internal adjustments which help businesses 
to offset and mitigate higher wage bill costs due to the MW increases. Some of these adjustment 
mechanisms have not been adequately explored in prior studies; yet they help to reconcile the 
controversial findings of insignificant or small positive employment effects.  
Results indicate that the 2007-2009 federal MW increases did not have a discernable 
negative or positive effect on employment or work hours for restaurants in my sample. 
Employment and hours elasticities are not precisely estimated, both positive and negative, and 
are not statistically significant. Non-employment channels of adjustment to higher labor costs 
include higher output prices, lower profits, reduced use of overtime work, wage compression, 
adjustment in work schedules and greater worker productivity. These findings seem to support 
Flinn‘s (2006) assessment that ―the ‗textbook‘ competitive model of the labor market […] may 
have serious deficiencies in accounting for minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes.‖ 
While inconsistent with the most narrowly-defined simple competitive model, the results 
presented in this dissertation are in agreement with an expanded version of the standard model 
which allows more margins of adjustment and more flexible production function, in the context 
of an imperfectly competitive product market. A more cautious implication is that the models of 
perfect competition and monopsony may lack predictive power in assessing the 
multidimensional effects of the MW increases and should be revised. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief theoretical 
overview of labor market theories and the different predictions of the MW effects. Section III 
reviews empirical studies on the economic impacts of the MW increase. Section IV describes 
data sources and provides descriptive data of the sample. Section V outlines the estimation 
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strategy used to measure employment and hours effects. Principal results from the payroll data 
analysis and robustness check are presented in Sections VI and VII, respectively. Evidence on 
non-employment responses to the MW based on payroll data and descriptive evidence are 
discussed in Section VIII. Section IX presents analysis of internal adjustments from manager and 
employee surveys; Section X briefly discusses the implications of the primary results for the 
theoretical models. Discussion is concluded in Section XI.  
II. Theoretical Models of Labor Markets  
The standard competitive model, and to a lesser extent, monopsony model, have been 
widely used as an interpretive framework for the majority of the MW empirical studies. In this 
section I briefly review different theoretical models of labor markets and the predicted MW 
effects generated by these models (Table 1). The theoretical models reviewed include: perfectly 
competitive, monopsony, behavioral, Post-Keynesian and institutional. This analysis suggests 
that that framework for analyzing MW may need to be broadened to go beyond the simple 
competitive and monopsony models.  
 Competitive model. 
Key characteristics. In a perfectly competitive model of labor markets under well-known 
assumptions of perfect information, profit-maximizing behavior, and free mobility, the 
interaction of the labor demand and labor supply curves determines the market wage rate. An 
individual firm faces a perfectly elastic labor supply curve, implying that it can hire any number 
of workers it requires at that wage level (Mincer, 1976; David Neumark & Wascher, 2008; 
Stigler, 1946). Infinite elasticity of the labor supply curve also implies that lowering the wage by 
any amount results in employees immediately leaving their workplace to be rehired elsewhere. 
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Employers do not have power to set wages and face a uniform wage determined by the labor 
market. They set the level of employment at the point where the marginal cost of the last workers 
hired is equal to the extra revenue produced (i.e., marginal revenue product of labor). Figure 2A 
is a representation of these assumptions at the market level. 
Predictions. Figure 2A shows the economic effects of a MW increase in a competitive market 
with a covered and uncovered sector
2
. Starting at the equilibrium wage W1, a higher mandated 
wage of W2 in the covered sector increases the marginal cost of hiring an additional worker. In 
response, firms move along their downward-sloping marginal revenue product of labor curve 
until they reach the point where the marginal revenue product of labor is equal to marginal cost, 
ceteris paribus. As a result, the work force (or work hours) is reduced to L2, amounting to lay-
offs of L1-L2. In the longer run, the negative employment effect may be reinforced if the labor 
demand curve becomes more elastic due to capital-labor substitution. The elasticity of the 
demand curve is determined by four factors: the price elasticity of demand for the final product; 
the share of labor in total cost; substitutability of capital inputs for labor; and the elasticity of the 
supply of capital and other factor inputs.  
The prediction is less certain in regards to unemployment in the covered sector.  As a 
result of the minimum wage provision, the quantity of workers supplied exceeds quantity 
demanded by L3-L2. If all these workers continue to seek employment in the covered sector, 
unemployment remains at L3-L2. However, some of these workers may become discouraged and 
drop out of labor force or seek employment in the uncovered sector. Thus, unemployment may 
increase but the prediction is less certain since some of the L1-L2 laid-off workers may seek 
employment opportunities in the uncovered sector, graphically represented by a rightward shift 
                                                 
2
 However, since the Federal MW covers 98 percent of workforce, one-sector discussion is typically more 
applicable. 
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in the labor supply curve in Figure 2B. An excess supply of labor creates downward pressure on 
the wage in the uncovered sector.  If the wage is not flexible, the uncovered sector will 
experience unemployment; if the wage is flexible downward, then the wage will fall, leading to 
an increase in employment from the initial equilibrium L4 to L5.   
Ultimately, the extent to which MW increases earnings of low-wage workers depends on 
the elasticity of the demand curve: the more employment is responsive to changes in the wage 
rate (greater elasticity), the greater is the percentage decline in jobs and hours. 
 Other predicted economic effects include the following: higher consumer prices (as the 
cost shock is passed onto consumers); decreased short-run profits; possibly lower general on-the-
job training (since employer cannot pass the cost of training onto the worker in the form of lower 
wages); and decreased aggregate output (some businesses exit and remaining firms reduce 
output). For society as a whole, the burden of the MW ―tax‖ is misallocation of productive 
resources and reduced output, represented by a movement inside the production possibility 
frontier. The benefit of a higher MW is shared by the low-skilled workers if they are able to 
maintain their jobs. 
Monopsony  
Key characteristics. The term ―monopsony‖ is used to describe two types of the labor markets. 
Classic or structural monopsony, attributed to Robinson (1969), pertains to the case of a single 
buyer of labor in the market where the firm faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve. More 
recently, the ―new‖ approach to monopsony posits that employers (both in concentrated and non-
concentrated markets) face a labor supply of curve that is not perfectly elastic because of market 
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imperfections, including limited mobility, search costs, and imperfect information (Manning, 
2003)
3
.   
In a monopsonistic labor market (Figure 3) the marginal cost of hiring a worker MC(L) is 
greater the new worker‘s wage w(L). Unlike the competitive firm, which offers the same market 
wage to attract more workers, the monopsonistic firm has to increase the wage of its current 
(inframarginal) workers as well. The profit is maximized where the marginal cost equals to the 
marginal revenue product, resulting in the equilibrium level of employment L1 (and wage w1)—
lower than the employment level in the competitive market (Lc). The elasticity of the labor 
supply curve determines the extent to which the worker‘s marginal revenue product diverges 
from the wage rate (also referred to as a ―monopsonistic exploitation‖). Specifically, the 
proportional gap between the marginal revenue product and the wage is equal to the inverse of 
the labor supply elasticity (Hirsch & Schumacher, 2005). Intuitively, the less elastic is the labor 
supply curve, the greater the ability of a firm to ―underpay‖ its workers.4 A monopsonist does not 
have a labor demand schedule as traditionally defined: in contrast to the competitive market, 
MC(L) is upward-sloping which, jointly with the upward sloping supply curve, determines the 
equilibrium combinations of wage and employment. 
Predictions. The effect of the MW depends on how high the minimum is set relative to the 
competitive wage level. In principle, there are two counteracting forces: on the one hand, the 
                                                 
3
 Hirsch and Schumacher (2005) test for ―classic‖ and ―new‖ monopsony in the market for registered nurses. 
Presence of the ―classic‖ monopsony implies that relative wages of nurses relate negatively to hospital system 
concentration and market size. On the other hand, a high proportion of new hires from outside employment 
(unemployment or out of labor force) would imply little mobility across employers and support for the ―new‖ 
monopsony.  
 
4
 Hirsch and Schumacher (2005, p. 973) argue that the inverse should not necessarily hold: presence of inelastic 
labor supply curve is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for employers to possess and exercise power with 
respect to wages. The reason is that imperfect information and limited mobility may not harm workers but may 
actually be beneficial if they are associated with incentive contracts, specific training and worker rents.  
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MW raises the average cost of labor and, on the other hand, there is a reduction in incremental 
wage increase for inframarginal workers, up to the point where the minimum wage equals the 
competitive wage. Hence, if the MW is placed between the wage paid by the monopsonist (w1) 
and the wage paid by in the perfectly competitive market (wc), as shown in Figure 2, 
employment will increase to L2 because the marginal cost of hiring a worker falls and is equal to 
the new MW (until L2) (there is a discontinuity in the marginal cost curve, marked in bold in 
Figure 2). However, if the minimum is set above wc, employment is reduced just as the 
competitive model predicts. Ultimately, the effect of the minimum wage on employment depends 
on the size of the increase.
5
 
Other economic effects of the MW in the monopsonistic setting are less clear. The 
product price should fall if employment increases because output also increases. However, lower 
price effects have not found much empirical support
6
. In the long run, product prices may 
increase if some firms exit or if the MW is raised further and exceeds the competitive level. In 
addition, and despite small employment gains, if the average total cost exceeds the market price 
level, firms will eventually have to reduce employment and may go out of business. Additional 
outcomes may include the following: 1) largest gains for minority and low-skill workers since 
they experienced the largest exploitation prior to the MW increase; 2) labor turnover is likely to 
                                                 
5
 It is crucial to keep in mind that these conclusions are based on the partial equilibrium model of a single 
monopsonist, and the extent to which the conclusions remain true in a general equilibrium model is obscure.  As 
Manning (2003) notes, the aggregate employment effect in the general equilibrium setting depends on the elasticity 
of the labor supply curve to the market as a whole, and not simply on the elasticity of the labor supply to a single 
firm. The employment effect, in contrast to the partial equilibrium outcome, may not be positive for a low level of 
the minimum wage in oligopsonistic labor market.  
6
 The inconsistency between small positive employment effect of the New Jersey minimum wage and higher 
product prices is known as the ―Card and Krueger paradox.‖ Shepherd (2000), however, recognizes, that the 
minimum wage shifts firms‘ long-run average costs upward, thus encouraging some firms to exit the industry and 
increasing product prices in the remaining firms. 
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decrease; and 3) similar to the competitive model prediction, on-the-job training is likely to fall 
(since the wage floor inhibits employers‘ ability to pass the cost of training onto workers).  
A closely related theoretical model assumes search costs for job-seekers and employers 
are the main source of monopsony power (Ahn, Arcidiacono, & Wessels, ; Burdett & Mortensen, 
1998; Flinn, 2006; Flinn & Heckman, 1982; van den Berg & Ridder, 1998). In these models, 
MW induces individuals to enter the labor market and search for jobs. These models are 
generally consistent with monopsony-like implications for employment, although the results vary 
significantly with the assumptions. For instance, Flinn (2006) analyzes effects of changes in MW 
in a continuous-time model of search with Nash bargaining and finds that MW increase may 
have ambiguous effects on employment in such context, it can improve welfare on both the 
supply and the demand side of the labor market.  
Behavioral models 
Key characteristics. The fundamental assumption of behavioral models—which include 
efficiency-wage,  shirking, labor turnover, adverse selection and gift-exchange versions—is that 
labor is not an inert commodity but is rather embodied in human beings who respond in 
predictable psychological/sociological ways to a higher rate of pay. These theories often assume 
imperfect and costly information, presence of moral hazard, heterogeneity of the work force, and 
less-than-perfectly-elastic labor supply curve (which implies that employers have some power to 
set wages). In contrast to the competitive model, where wages (and reservation wages for 
involuntary unemployed workers) are bid down until the market equilibrates, behavioral wage 
models posit that employers for various reasons do not find it in their best interest to cut wages, 
even if unemployed workers are willing to take jobs for less pay. The potential benefits of not 
10 
 
 
 
lowering the wage stem from productivity-increasing or cost-saving effects of a higher wage rate 
(Yellen, 1984).   
Productivity-enhancing and motivational properties of the wage rate are the principal 
characteristics of the efficiency wage model (Solow, 1979; Stiglitz, 1974, 1976).  According to 
this model, the wage rate has a direct effect on worker‘s effort level and thus enters the 
production function.  Greater productivity for affected workers is a result of improved morale or 
better ability to satisfy their physical and nutritional needs. Enhanced productivity implies that 
more output can be produced with the same amount of labor and capital, hence employment may 
not change or may even increase following the MW increase. A related idea is embedded in the 
gift-exchange model, which assumes that higher MW affects the workers‘ perception of fairness. 
Since the employer-employee relationship is based on mutual reciprocity, the ―gift‖ of higher 
income via MW compliance is reciprocated with higher productivity, improved workers morale, 
and less conflict among workers.  
In addition to a positive effect on productivity, a higher MW may lead to some cost-
savings which, at least to some degree, offset the increase in firm‘s total wage bill.  There are 
three closely-related explanations for why this may be the case—shirking, labor turnover, and 
adverse selection. First, according to the shirking model, developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984), as a result of a higher wage rate a worker does not ―shirk‖ because the relative cost of 
losing the job is higher. Also, the cost of monitoring the workers‘ effort is reduced since the 
threat of being unemployed serves a disciplinary role. Similarly, according to the labor turnover 
model, workers who receive a raise as a result of the MW increase have greater job attachment, 
which reduces turnover costs and increase expected returns on employer-provided training (J. 
Salop & Salop, 1976; S. C. Salop, 1979; Stiglitz, 1974, 1985). Finally, in the adverse selection 
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model workers have heterogeneous ability which is positively correlated with their reservation 
wages (Stiglitz, 1976). As Yellen (1984, p. 203) points out, ―[the] willingness of an individual to 
work for less than the going wage places an upper bound on his ability, raising the firm‘s 
estimate that [the worker] is a lemon.‖ Similarly, Drazen (1986) suggests that once adverse 
selection is eliminated by increasing competitive market wage to a higher wage rate, an 
improvement in worker skills more than offsets the increase in labor costs.  
Predictions. A positive impact of higher wages on productivity has several important 
implications for the analysis of MW effects. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of a MW under the 
competitive labor market assumptions but where wages and worker productivity are positively 
correlated. Prior to the minimum wage, the equilibrium level of employment is L1 and the 
corresponding market wage is W1. If the new minimum is set at W2, then under the efficiency-
wage model, workers increase their effort, making the marginal revenue product of each worker 
higher. A greater marginal revenue product translates into a rightward shift in the demand curve; 
however the extent of the shift ultimately depends on the responsiveness of individual worker 
effort to changes in wage rates. The new demand curve (Demand 2) implies that at the new wage 
level each worker contributes more to the output and employment expands to L2.  
Endogenous work effort models posit there may be a positive effect of the MW on 
employment as workers become more productive but other effects are ambiguous. Aaronson et 
al. (2008) show that a small price increases are consistent with assumptions of endogenous work 
effort. However, if more output is produced due to greater productivity of workers, prices may 
go down. In the long run, the positive productivity effects may wear off and workers‘ 
productivity may converge to the original level, leading to price increases. Non-wage benefits 
may be reduced according to the principal of compensating differentials, or they may be 
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increased as part of the ―gift exchange.‖ A firm may invest in general on-the-job training since 
labor turnover is reduced and the firm can now capture some of the returns.  
Post-Keynesian (PK) model 
Key characteristics. Effective demand is the central concept in the PK
7
 theory of labor markets.  
According to this model, the economy is demand-driven, and investment and capital 
accumulation do not derive from the intertemporal consumption decisions of households (N. 
Shapiro, 1977). The level of output is inherently determined by the demand for a firm‘s products, 
and at the aggregate level, the supply of output is determined up to the point of full resource 
utilization (the production possibilities frontier) by the effective demand. In addition, the concept 
of the production function is modified into a utilization function,
8
 which assumes no decreasing 
returns as long as capacity utilization is below 100 percent. Thus, if a firm operates just below its 
full capacity, it can vary its level of employment and intensity with which a given stock of 
capital is utilized (Lavoie, 2006). Labor generally is divided into two types: blue-collar (variable) 
workers and overhead (fixed) white-collar workers, unrelated to production.  
The PK theory is concerned more with the aggregate labor market than with a single 
industry. Figure 5 depicts the demand for labor and the principle of the effective demand (goods 
market).  For the economy as a whole, there is a positive relation between the real wage and the 
equilibrium level of employment. Intuitively, an increase in real wages leads to higher aggregate 
consumption spending, which in turn leads to increased demand for labor and lower 
unemployment. Thus, an increase in the real wage w/p implies movement along the curve, and 
                                                 
7
 The term ―post-Keynesian‖ is a vague concept, unifying an ensemble of economists. The founding fathers of the 
PK economics are the Cambridge economists of the 1950s, such as Joan Robinson, Richard Kahn, and Nicholos 
Kaldor (Lavoie, 1992). 
 
8
 The concept was first proposed by Joan Robinson in 1964 (Lavoie, 2006). 
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hence a higher level of employment
9
.  The curve is asymptotic to the horizontal line yv, 
representing the constant marginal product of variable labor; thus, the real wage has an upper 
bound, i.e., the productivity of blue-collar workers.  Employment is restricted by Lfemp which is 
the number of workers who can be hired at full capacity of output.  The supply curve of labor 
(vertical) is the level of employment at full capacity, with the corresponding real wage rate of 
(w/p)f. If the real wage rate is set at (w/p)* and the corresponding level of employment is L, then 
there is unemployment, equal to Lfemp-L. According to the perfectly competitive model, the 
excess supply of labor should exert a downward pressure on wages to bring employment back to 
equilibrium. However, in this case, lower real wage creates lower effective demand and erodes 
employment.  
Predictions. Economic effects of the MW increase in the PK framework are antithesis to 
neoclassical predictions. In the diagram, if the real minimum wage is increased from (w/p)1 to 
(w/p)2, the new level of employment is traced along the effective demand curve, from L1 to L2. 
As long as the full capacity is not exceeded, an increase in real wages leads to increased 
aggregate consumption and more workers are needed to satisfy greater product demand. The 
supply in the economy is demand-driven, determined by the effective demand.  As a result of the 
MW increase, the economy is closer to full employment because it positively stimulates 
aggregate demand. 
 The effect on prices is ambiguous. Prices may increase if firms use ―cost-plus‖ pricing; 
on the other hand, prices may decrease if larger output leads to lower average costs (economies 
of scale). Other predicted effects are also uncertain. Higher real wages, for example, may reduce 
                                                 
9
 This positive relation between the real wage and employment is sometimes termed the ―Kaleckian paradox of 
costs.‖ According to Lavoie (2006), the paradox relates to the crucial distinction between behavior of a single firm 
and many firms across different markets: ―While it is true that each individual firm could increase its profits by 
lowering its unit wage costs—if it acted alone—overall profits will not in the end by any higher. Once all firms have 
lowered wages and, by keeping prices constant, increased their mark-ups, they will end up selling fewer goods.‖ 
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turnover but a tighter labor market may lead to higher turnover. Likewise, a higher wage floor 
may reduce workers‘ ability to receive general on-the-job training, but greater job attachment 
may increase an employer‘s incentive to undertake the investment. 
Institutional Model 
Key characteristics. Institutional labor economics (ILE) defines institutions broadly as a set of 
rules, legal constructs and informal arrangements which govern the functioning of society and 
operation of the economy.  According to ILE, labor markets (as all markets) are imperfectly 
competitive due to non-zero transaction costs, incomplete contracts, and heterogeneous workers 
(Kaufman) .  Because of these factors, firms have slack and labor markets have indeterminacies 
which make competitive predictions uncertain or even reversed in sign.  As Figure 6 illustrates, 
the labor demand curve may resemble a ―band,‖ where the wage-employment combinations are 
not unique, and wage rates are dispersed around the wage rate Wc, which would prevail in the 
perfectly competitive market. The area is bounded by some upper and lower limits of wage rates, 
Wu and Wl, respectively. The majority of firms pay a wage which is close to the market wage 
Wc, but some are at either end of the wage distribution (Kaufman, ; Lester, 1952).  The size of 
the indeterminacy area will vary depending on the degree to which the market conditions come 
close to the perfectly competitive model.  
Predictions. The model does not generate a clear-cut prediction about the labor market effects of 
the MW increase. Depending on the initial position of a firm in the wage distribution relative to 
the competitive wage, a higher minimum wage may lead to higher, almost unchanged, or lower 
employment. However, akin to the behavioral models described earlier, the IE postulates that the 
marginal product of labor may be a function of the wage rate; thus, higher minimum wage may 
lead to increased productivity.  In addition, the minimum wage mandate may serve an important 
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social purpose of balancing the inequality of bargaining power by protecting workers rights and 
ending exploitation, increasing efficiency (through greater work effort, more effective 
management practices, etc.) and improving equity.  
 Other predicted effects depend on the extent to which markets deviate from the 
assumptions of the competitive model.  If employment is increased as a result of the higher 
minimum wage and there is a positive effect on productivity, then the predicted effects on labor 
turnover, benefits and training are similar to those from the behavioral models. If the opposite is 
true, the predicted effects are more negative and closer to the competitive model predictions. 
 The standard competitive model of labor markets is central for framing the MW 
discussion, while alternative models reviewed in this section—except for the monopsony 
model—have remained largely in the background. The difficulty in using and testing for 
alternative models stems from their impracticality and inherent ambiguity with respect to clear-
cut predictions of the MW effects. Hence, in this research the competitive model is not 
abandoned but instead its expanded version is considered. This integrated approach allows me to 
consider a broad range of internal business responses which lessen the marginal cost shocks due 
to higher labor costs, considerably enhancing the depth of my analysis.  
III. Literature Review: Channels of Adjustment 
The empirical literature is extensive. Table 2 shows various adjustment mechanisms 
through which markets, managers and employees may respond to the MW increase; relevant 
empirical research is also presented. Since a thorough review is beyond the scope of this study 
(see David  Neumark & Wascher, 2007 for an in-depth survey of the MW literature), in this 
section a brief review of prior literature is presented, with a focus on: 1) employment effects of 
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the MW mandate, the most commonly studied labor market response to the MW laws; 2) other 
non-employment channels of adjustment. 
MW and Employment 
Does higher MW reduce employment? Much research effort has been devoted over the 
last century to answer this question. The pioneers of the MW research (Obenauer & Nienburg, 
1915; Peterson, 1959) have used qualitative methods and detailed case studies of low-wage 
industries to evaluate the impact of the MW laws on employment. National time-series studies 
later examined the employment responses with respect to changes in federal MW laws, finding a 
negative but low teenage employment elasticities (between -0.3 and -0.1) (Brown, Gilroy, & 
Kohen, 1982).  
Recent MW studies generally fall into two groups, based on their methodological 
approaches. The first group of studies uses panel data at the state or county level, exploiting the 
fact that many states have established their own state MW rates, setting them above the federal 
level. Thus the variation in the federal MW rates may have no (or a very small) impact on 
markets where state minima exceed the federal rate, while having a greater impact in those states 
where the federal rate is binding. Typically using the Current Population Survey (CPS) or other 
national household survey data to examine employment responses
10
 to changes in state and 
federal MW rates, these studies—with rare exceptions—tend to find evidence of adverse labor 
demand effects for sub-groups of low-skilled workers, with employment elasticities ranging from 
                                                 
10
 The dependent variable is typically the log of employment rate for a particular demographic group; the MW 
variable is typically expressed as the real effective MW rate or as the relative minimum wage (ratio of the prevailing 
W rate to the average wage for a particular demographic group). A standard set of controls for the business cycle, as 
well as state and year fixed effects are also included in the estimation. In fact, the appropriateness of including year 
effects in such models has been a contentious issue, since the results are inconsistent. For instance, Burkhauser et al. 
(2000a, b) argue that inclusion of year effects substantially reduces identifying variation of the minimum wage, and 
should not be included. See Sabia (2009) for a more thorough discussion of this issue. 
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-0.2 to -0.3 on average (Burkhauser, Couch, & Wittenburg, 2000a, 2000b; David Neumark & 
Wascher, 1992, 2006; Sabia, 2009)
11
.  
The second class of MW studies examines the impact of the MW policy change on a 
sample of establishments, most often in the fast-food and retail industries where the impact of the 
MW laws is the strongest. Exploiting the variation in the MW impact across businesses in low-
wage and high-wage markets, in a relatively short time frame, these studies use variants of 
difference-in-difference estimates. This ―quasi-experimental‖ approach in the MW literature 
originated with a series of studies by Card (1992a, 1992b), Katz and Krueger (1992). Best known 
is the work by Card and Krueger (1994), who uncovered small positive or insignificant 
employment effects in a sample of fast-food restaurants following an increase of New Jersey 
MW rate, relative to a similar set of restaurants in Pennsylvania where MW hike was non-
binding. Their findings were treated as an assault to the entire classical school of labor 
economics Ehrenberg (1992, p. 827): 
Taken at face value, [Card and Kruger‘s] findings suggest that simple competitive 
demand and supply models do not provide adequate description of low-wage labor 
market, the very labor markets in which one might expect these models to ―work the 
best.‖ Taken at face value, their findings also cast considerable doubt on empirical 
research methods used by generations of labor economists. 
These unsettling implications of Card and Krueger‘s work triggered a surge in MW studies, 
attempting to explain away their findings but with only mixed success (Card & Krueger, 2000; 
David Neumark & Wascher, 2000). A number of studies have followed in Card and Krueger‘s 
                                                 
11
 However, applying meta-analysis, Card and Krueger (1995) and more recently Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
dispute these findings on the ground of publication bias and specification searching. 
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methodological tradition and continue to find small positive but often insignificant employment 
effects. For example, Dube et al. (2007) adopt a similar econometric approach to investigate the 
economic effects of a citywide San Francisco MW, relative to the neighboring Alameda county, 
and do not detect any significant employment loss due to the MW mandate. 
Recent minimum wage studies have attempted to address the statistical issues present in 
prior work. Among the main concerns in the case of state-level panel studies is the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity in employment growth across states, in practice creating a downward 
bias in the estimates of the employment elasticities. Common criticisms of the establishment-
level cross-section approach include spatial autocorrelation with inconsistent standard errors
12
, 
lack of external validity due to a limited geographic focus, and insufficient lag time to capture 
the employment adjustments. For instance, Addison et al. (2008) examine county-level 
employment at the restaurant-and-bar sector from 1990-2006 and incorporate trends in this 
sector‘s employment to account for unobserved heterogeneity in employment growth. While they 
do not find support for lower employment in the restaurant-and-bar sector, there is compelling 
evidence that without controls for trends in employment traditional fixed-effects estimates are 
biased toward uncovering a negative employment effect. Dube et al. (2008) use the minimum 
wage policy discontinuities at the state borders to identify the effects of the minimum wage on 
earnings and employment in restaurant and other low-wage sectors within contiguous county 
pairs between 1990 and 2006. Their findings also point to the presence of spurious negative 
employment effects due to spacial heterogeneities in the employment trends. They find no 
                                                 
12
 In this case, individual firm level observations are treated as independent when in reality the correlation in non-
zero. Bertrand et al. (2004) test for this bias by randomly generating placebo laws in state-level data on female 
wages from the Current Population Survey. They use standard difference-in-difference approach to estimate the 
―effect‖ on wages and find that their standard errors significantly overstate precision of the estimates.   
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employment effects of MW increases after controlling for both local and regional employment 
trends. 
In a paper closely related to this study, Giuliano (2009) uses data from personnel records 
on individual employees from 700 retail stores located nation-wide, from January 1996 to July 
1998, to exploit geographic variation in the state minimum wages and its impact on retail 
employment. Her micro-level data are similar to data used in this study, with an important 
distinction being the presence of hours worked in our data set. One disadvantage of the Giuliano 
study is that the national chain adjusted its sharing formula with its stores in response to the MW, 
possibly diluting differences across stores in their responses. Consistent with non-competitive 
labor market theories linking higher minimum wage to greater labor supply, she finds that 
employment did not fall as predicted by the competitive model but the employment effect varies 
across the types of workers (teenagers versus adults) and across geographic areas (high- versus 
low-income areas).   
Minimum wage and non-employment channels of adjustment 
The next topic of discussion will be empirical research on the non-employment effects of 
the MW policy (Table 2).  
Market response 
Output prices.  The conventional perfectly competitive model of a binding MW predicts 
an increase in the output price in reaction to a minimum wage. According to the ―pass-through‖ 
argument, an increase in the minimum wage leads to higher output prices, and the higher costs 
are shifted to consumers. In the long run, the demand for the product falls and profits are 
reduced. The ―hungry teenagers‖ hypothesis posits the opposite:  higher incomes of low-wage 
workers due to a MW increase stimulate the demand for low-wage products, increasing business 
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profitability. The overall effect on the fast-food industry from a theoretical standpoint is 
therefore ambiguous. However, ignoring the aggregate demand and supply effects, a simple 
theoretical prediction of a full pass-through (under the assumption of constant-returns to scale 
production function) is that the increase in price should be proportional to the share of minimum 
wage labor in the total factor cost.   
Empirically, there is a general consensus that a higher MW leads to higher output prices. 
Lemos (2008) provides a thorough discussion of approximately 30 ―price effects‖ studies). For 
instance, Card and Krueger (1994) find that a pre-tax price of a standard fast-food meal increases 
by approximately 4 percent in response to the MW increase— which is a slightly higher than 
needed to ―pass through‖ the labor cost increase. Aaronson et al. (2008) using a different 
methodological approach also find evidence of unambiguous price increases in response to the 
MW policies; however, the reported price elasticities are small, ranging from 0.07-0.155. Dube 
et al. (2007) conclude that price effects are location-specific and operate at the geographical 
market level, with higher prices at locations more affected by the city-wide MW increase but no 
detected differences across more and less affected restaurants within the same location.  
Profits/Business Growth.  According to the competitive model, the MW floor is 
detrimental to business profitability and growth. However, there is hardly any empirical evidence 
on the effect of the MW increase on firm performance, mainly because of data unavailability, as 
well as technical difficulties of identifying an appropriate time horizon that captures long-run 
effects.  
Two studies are notable exceptions. Card and Krueger (1995) use shareholder value of 
the firm to proxy for profitability effects resulting from the anticipated MW increase, finding 
mixed evidence. While no systematic relationship is uncovered for the 1989 federal MW 
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increase, subsequent news about possible MW increases coincided with one to two percent 
variations in shareholder wealth. In a more recent study, Draca et al. (forthcoming)  examine 
differential impact of the 1999 national MW in the United Kingdom on profitability of low-wage 
(residential care) firms, as well as a large number of firms in other sectors. Using a difference-in-
differences approach, they find that firm profitability was significantly reduced (23 percent fall 
in profit margins for the average care home and 8 to 11 percent reduction in profit margins for 
the average affected firms from other sectors); interestingly, the authors uncover no increase in 
firm exits. 
Manager response 
Hours worked. Firms are able to adjust not only the number of workers but also the hours 
each person works. In fact, given fixed costs of employment in the form of hiring and training 
expenditures, firms may prefer cutting hours to downsizing their workforce. This especially may 
be true in the fast-food industry where employers try to reduce costly labor turnover by 
instituting flexible work arrangements for their part-time workers. This allows fast-food 
establishments to adjust work hours fairly regularly in response to demand fluctuations. The 
higher is the share of fixed costs of employment in total costs, the greater is the elasticity of 
hours worked, and more employees work overtime.  
Empirical evidence on the hours effect is inconclusive and, similar to the employment 
effect studies, results vary. As discussed in Sabia (2009), elasticities of hours worked derived 
from time-series studies using CPS data are sensitive to the inclusion of year effects. For 
instance, Couch and Wittenburg (2001) do not use year effects in their model and find a 
substantial decrease in teenage work hours (elasticities between 0.48 and 0.77). When year 
effects are included (Zavodny, 2000), no effect on hours worked (and small positive effect on 
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teenagers‘ work hours) is uncovered. Sabia (2009) attempts to resolve this issue by conducting a 
number of robustness checks. He finds consistent evidence that a 10 percent minimum wage hike 
reduces average weekly hours worked by teenagers between 3.7 to 5.1 percent. These results did 
not remain unchallenged. Using a quasi-experimental research design, Dube et al. (2007) find 
that total hours of work grew more in their treated sample as compared to their control sample, 
yet the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, Orrenius and Zavodny (2008) do not 
find evidence for reduced hours worked among low-skilled immigrants—a group for whom one 
would expect more adverse effects. In fact, the effect appears to vary among workers with other 
demographic characteristics:  the authors uncover an increase in the average hours worked for 
male teen workers (elasticity of 0.1) but a decrease for female teen workers (elasticity of -0.13). 
Fewer studies address overtime work explicitly: Fairris and Reich (2005) find a reduction in 
overtime hours in a subsample of establishments affected by the living wage policies in Los-
Angeles, relative to non-living wage comparable establishments.   
Turnover rates. Labor turnover is costly to firms because there are costs associated with 
filling in vacancies, training new workers and initially low productivity of a new hire. From a 
worker‘s perspective, higher wages should reduce voluntary quits among the affected workers, 
reducing hiring and training costs.  Empirical evidence capturing greater job attachment as a 
result of the MW increase is quite limited. Dube et al. (2007), using difference-in-difference 
approach, offer suggestive evidence of increased tenure (by roughly three and a half month) as a 
result of a city-wide MW hike but no evidence of reduced job separation rates in their sample
13
. 
Using a mix of administrative and survey data, Reich et al. (2005) find that turnover fell 
                                                 
13
 It is likely that workers‘ tenure in their sample is measured with error. Specifically, to measure turnover the 
survey respondent was asked how long the firm‘s ―typical worker‖ had been working at the restaurant—which is 
likely to be imprecise. In addition, for the fast-food industry where turnover rates are very high, an increase of 3 and 
a half month in turnover on average appears to be rather high.  
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drastically among airline service firms that experienced the highest wage cost increases as a 
result of the San Francisco airport living wage ordinance and its related program. Airport 
screening workers, whose wages grew by 55 percent, experienced the most prominent decrease 
in turnover rates (80 percent).  Using the difference-in-differences approach, Fairris (2005) 
examines the impact of Los Angeles living wage ordinances on a number of human resource 
outcomes among the city service contractor firms affected by the ordinance and a set of 
establishments from the industrial sectors, which were not covered by the ordinance. He finds 
lower turnover rates (35 percent lower on average) in the living wage subsample, relative to 
nonliving wage establishments. However, the study suffers from a number of econometric issues, 
including the retrospective nature of the data, sample-selection, comparability between the 
treatment and control groups, and inadequate control for the difference in timing of the 
ordinances taking an effect.  
Training. Theoretical models are not unanimous in their predictions with regard to the 
MW effect on worker training. Very few studies address this issue empirically, and their 
evidence is inconclusive. Card and Krueger (1995) find no evidence of MW hikes effect on 
training. Similarly, Reich et al. (2005) find that the airline service firms at San Francisco airport, 
experiencing a significant rise in labor costs as a result of the living wage ordinance, increased 
the amount of initial or on-the-job training provided but the result was not statistically 
significant. Fairris (2005) examines the effects of Los Angeles living wage ordinance on a range 
of labor market outcomes, including turnover. He finds reduced job training in the affected 
establishments, relative to the control group. 
Salary compression. Higher labor costs due to the MW mandate may significantly limit a 
firm‘s ability to give proportional raises (in the form of bonuses or scheduled performance-based 
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raises) to workers earning above the minimum desired in order to preserve the internal wage-
tenure hierarchy. The difference in earnings between the highest-paid/most experienced workers 
and the newly hired/low-wage workers is likely to be reduced. Empirically, very few studies 
address this issue. Card and Krueger (1994) find no evidence that the time before the wage 
increase and the amount of raises are negatively affected by the minimum wage increase. 
However, wage compression within a firm is supported by evidence from a study of the city-
wide MW increase by Dube et al. (2007). 
Skill/Compositional changes in workforce. Small changes in employment levels 
associated with the higher MW may conceal compositional changes in the workforce, such as 
substitution away from low-productivity workers (typically less-experienced, teenage workers) 
towards those with higher productivity (older, more experienced workers). Also known as labor-
labor substitution, this may also occur if employers have preferences for a certain type of worker 
(by gender, race, etc.). A number of studies have examined compositional changes by looking at 
the aggregated employment rates for different demographic groups at the state level, and find 
heterogeneous employment effects. Neumark and Wascher (1996) use CPS data and find 
evidence consistent with substitution away from teenage workers as a result of the MW increase. 
Taking a similar approach, Burkhauser et al. (2000a, 2000b) find that the most vulnerable groups 
in the working-age population—including young adults without a high school degree (aged 20-
24), young black adults and black teenagers (aged 16-24), and teenagers (aged 16-19)—have 
been the most adversely affected by the MW mandates, relative to other demographic subgroups. 
More recently, Ahn et al. (forthcoming)  develop a search model with endogenous labor supply 
and demand and test it using CPS data for teenagers. They find that teenagers from more affluent 
(more educated) families ―crowd out‖ teenage workers from the less privileged background (less 
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educated families). An interesting contrast to this group of studies is Orrenius and Zavodny‘s 
(2008) work on the employment effects among immigrants: using CPS, they find no adverse 
employment effect as a result of the MW increase for immigrant workers, who for various 
reasons (language barriers, cultural differences) may also be considered one of the vulnerable 
labor market groups.  
 Fewer studies examine compositional shifts using establishment-level data. Fairris and 
Bujanda (2006) explore the extent of worker substitution based on both observed and unobserved 
worker characteristics at a sample of city contract establishments affected by the Los Angeles 
Living Wage Ordinance. Using employee surveys, they find evidence for substitution toward 
worker characteristics associated with higher pre-ordinance wages. Guiliano (2009) explores 
compositional changes in workforce among a large number of retail stores located nationwide. 
She finds a differential effect on teenage employment between low and high-wage markets. In 
higher-wage markets where, relative to an adult worker, increase in wages for teenagers was 
higher, employment of teens increased; the opposite is true in the low-wage locations. The author 
contends that the small positive employment effect for teenagers may be explained by more 
affluent teens entering the labor market. 
Employee benefits. According to the theory of compensating differentials, higher hourly 
earnings should lower non-wage compensation to existing and new employees. However, 
considering that benefits in quick-service restaurants are typically limited to a free or reduced-
price meal for hourly crew members, and occasionally health insurance for salaried managers, 
reduction in benefits is not likely to be an important strategy for offsetting the higher labor costs.  
Empirical evidence on changes in benefit structure is very scarce. Two studies have a 
measure of worker benefits but the results are ambiguous. Card and Krueger (1994) find that 
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although the proportion of restaurants offering meal price discounts fell in both treatment and 
control establishments, more restaurants in both groups were offering free meals after the 
minimum wage increase. However, the estimated effect of the MW increase on the likelihood of 
receiving a free or reduced-price meal is insignificant. Dube et al. (2007) look at health insurance 
coverage at the establishments in their sample affected by the MW law but fail to find any 
reductions in coverage. 
Worker response 
Increased productivity/effort/morale. As discussed earlier, several behavioral models of 
labor markets treat worker productivity as endogenous and assume a positive relationship 
between the wage and non-wage benefits and worker morale and effort. Reich et al. (2005) use 
data from employer surveys to assemble descriptive evidence of the effect of the living wage 
policies at the San Francisco Airport on employee performance. Their results suggest that higher 
wages and improved benefits generated significant improvements in workers‘ performance, 
including overall performance, improved morale, lower disciplinary issues, and better customer 
service. The authors supplement these findings with data from worker surveys and report greater 
skill requirements, more hard work and increased pace of work for employees receiving the 
wage increase. They conclude that the increased work effort is likely a reflection of 
combination of voluntary and involuntary effects.  
Lack of consensus in empirical findings points to the ―elusive‖ nature of the minimum 
wage effects on employment. In this respect, John Kennan (1995) noted that ―we just don‘t know 
how many jobs would be lost if the minimum wage were increased to $5.15, and … we are 
unlikely to find out by using more sophisticated methods of inference on the existing body of 
data. What is needed is more sophisticated data.‖  The variety of empirical findings on MW 
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employment effects and the limited research on non-employment responses leave the door open 
for additional research that brings to the table data that has detail on employment, hours, and 
pay, while at the same time providing complementary evidence on non-employment responses to 
minimum wages.  
IV. Data and Sample Description 
This study was able to obtain a new data set with more micro-level information than 
available for other studies, allowing for improvement in some of the problem areas noted above. 
Specifically, the study utilizes two complementary data sets on a sample of 81 Quick-Service 
restaurants located (QSRs) in Georgia and Alabama.  Since both states had to raise their state 
minimum wage rates to the new federal levels and the QSR sector is the most intensive user of 
low-wage work force, they are good candidates for investigating the effects of the 2007-2009 
federal minimum wage increases. The primary data set used to investigate employment effects 
comes from the confidential bi-weekly electronic payroll records of individual employees 
collected from January 2007 through December 2009. Other outcomes and firm responses to the 
minimum wage are explored qualitatively using a survey of store managers, which in turn is 
supplemented by data from confidential employee surveys and information from semi-structured 
interviews of sample business owners. Below we describe the data sets in more detail and 
provide descriptive data.  
Payroll records  
The primary data set for this study is constructed from confidential individual-level 
electronic payroll records of 81 QSR restaurants located in Georgia and Alabama, from January 
1, 2007 through December 31, 2009. Since for both states the federal MW mandate is binding, 
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they are good candidates for investigating the effect of the 2007-2009 federal MW increases. The 
focus is on the limited-service food sector because, along with retail sector, it is the most 
intensive user of low-wage workforce. The restaurants in the Georgia-Alabama sample are 
owned by three franchisees of one national QSR chain who have generously agreed to release the 
payroll data for this study under the condition of strict confidentiality
14
. Although my sample is 
non-random, we believe that it is representative of the fast-food sector in general since the 
products offered at fast-food restaurants are highly uniform and employees‘ skill sets are very 
similar
15
.  
The restaurants display substantial geographic variation within the two states: 20 
restaurants are located in 12 Eastern Alabama counties (close to the Georgia border) and the rest 
are located in 23 Georgia counties (in Central and Southern Georgia)
16
 (Map 1). Importantly, 
since wages in rural areas tend to be considerably lower, the spatial variation provides very 
useful source of differential impact of the minimum wage increases across stores and time 
periods in our sample.  
Electronic payroll data report the following information for each individual worker in a 
given pay-period (there are typically two pay periods per month
17
): store unit I.D., individual 
                                                 
14
 In further discussion of our sample, we have to maintain our confidentiality agreement and to ensure that neither 
the name of the restaurant chain nor the individual store units and their owners can be identified. 
 
15
 Unfortunately, persistent attempts to extend the sample beyond 81 units were unsuccessful. The corporate 
headquarters of the QSR chain after much deliberation refused to participate in the study.  However, adding 
franchisor stores would create problems of comparability since the decision-making process and operation model in 
these restaurants are likely to be quite different (much more centralized) compared to a franchisee-owned restaurant. 
 
16
 Four counties in Georgia have a higher concentration of stores from our sample than the average (approximately 
8.5 stores per county, compared to1.5 restaurants per county on average for the rest of the sample). 
 
17
 Payroll data for 65 stores were reported with an exact date of the payroll (day, month, year). For the rest of the 
sample, payroll was split by the first and the second half of each month. Thus all payroll data were aggregated bi-
monthly, i.e. for the first (within the first 16 days of each month) and the second half of each month. 
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worker I.D., job title (kitchen staff, assistant manager, etc.), regular hours worked, regular pay, 
an indicator equal to 1 if an employee worked overtime (and if so, the number of overtime hours 
and overtime pay) and total pay (regular pay plus overtime pay). Hourly wage rate was 
calculated by dividing regular pay by regular hours (some restaurant units reported the hourly 
wage rate separately). Since managers are salaried workers, their earnings are not part of an 
hourly-worker payroll and therefore managers are excluded from the analysis
18
.  
We have complete payroll records for all establishments during 36-months (72 pay-
periods), commencing in January, 2007. Six stores enter our sample later (one store opened in 
May 2007 and one in January 2008; four more stores were acquired by the owner in May 2007). 
None of the stores went out of business during the study period and one unit was closed for two 
months for remodeling (in September and October of 2009). In addition to the payroll data, we 
have information on monthly percentage change in sales.
19
 
Descriptive statistics for the payroll records data are presented in Table 3 in the 
Appendix. There are approximately 64,000 individual-level observations for each year in our 
sample (24 bi-weekly pay periods each year). The average hourly wage for the first 12 months is 
$6.27, increasing to $6.67 and $7.15 per hour for the last 12 months of the study period. It should 
be noted that all units are in compliance with the three Federal MW increases
20
. Interestingly, 
while the regular hours worked remain stable across the study period (at approximately 49 hours 
                                                 
18
 Inability to observe managers‘ earnings is one of the drawbacks of our data. It is possible that compression of 
managers‘ salaries (or postponed bonuses and raises) is one of the adjustment channels used to offset higher labor 
costs. 
  
19
 Only one franchisee owner provided the actual sales levels, while the other two owners kindly provided monthly 
percentage changes in sales to ensure confidentiality. Monthly percent change in sales is transformed into log points. 
 
20
 None of the stores from our sample utilize Youth or Training Minimum Wage, which sets a lower minimum wage 
for new employees who are under 21 years old for the first 60 to 90 days. The owners cited the long filing process 
and workers unwillingness to work for less than the minimum wage as two main reasons for not utilizing Youth or 
Training Minimum Wage. 
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each pay-period or approximately 24.5 hours per week), overtime work declines:  the share of 
employees working overtime decreases from 13 to 12 to 9 percent in 2007-2009, respectively, 
and the amount of overtime hours falls as well, from an average 0.74 hours to 0.45 hours in 
2009. 
Although limited in its geographic focus, the dataset used in this study possesses several 
distinct advantages. First, the key advantage is that our data is based on the individual-worker 
level instead of establishment-level averages. Data based on averages limit the ability to explore 
important aspects of the minimum wage impact, such as changes in the distribution of wages and 
wage compression. Importantly, the micro-level nature of data allows constructing a more 
precise measure of the relative cost impact of the higher minimum wage over the entire three-
year period—a much broader window than in related studies. The second asset is the presence of 
regular and overtime hours worked which are rarely available in other datasets. Finally, payroll 
data is highly accurate because it is collected for tax-reporting reasons, eliminating almost 
entirely our concern for measurement error due to recall. Unlike studies using self-reported 
measures of earnings and hours worked, or survey data which were collected over the phone 
(Card & Krueger, 1994; Dube et al., 2007), collection of our payroll data is retrospective and 
should not be influenced by our research question.  
Payroll data are supplemented with the county-level data from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW),
21
 produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), to control 
for any labor market fluctuations at the local level. The QCEW produces a comprehensive 
tabulation of employment and wage information based on ES-202 filings that every 
establishment is required to submit quarterly for the purpose of calculating payroll taxes for 
                                                 
21
 For more information on QCEW, please see http://www.bls.gov/cew/home.htm. 
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unemployment insurance—which accounts for 99.7 percent of all wage and salary civilian 
employment. Publicly available files include county-level data on the quarterly number of 
establishments, monthly employment, and quarterly wages by disaggregated North American 
Industrial Coding System (NAICS) industry and ownership sector. Specifically, we extract data 
on the total employment (as well as number of establishments and wages) for all industries and 
then separately for Accommodation and Food Services sector (NAICS sector number 72) and 
Retail sector (NAICS sector number 44-45) for the years 2007-2009
22
. In addition, population 
estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau‘s are used to compute annual population density at the 
county level. 
Manager and employee survey data 
In order to examine a wider range of firm responses to the MW increase, we use data 
collected from the written surveys of restaurant managers and employees (samples of both 
surveys are available from the author). Employee survey data provide a portrait of the workers in 
the sample in terms of the standard demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, 
marital status, income, etc.  
The questionnaires to managers and the hourly employees were administered in mid July-
early August, 2009. Each unit in our sample received a pre-paid package with 30-50 employee 
questionnaires and one questionnaire for the store manager. Survey questions were provided both 
in English and Spanish languages. On the instruction sheet, a manager was asked to distribute the 
surveys and to encourage their employees to fill them out; however, it was emphasized that the 
completion of the survey is completely voluntary. Each employee questionnaire was distributed 
                                                 
22
 We gather these data at the 2, 3 and 4-digit disaggregated levels, which includes Food Service and Drinking 
Places sector (NAICS 722) and Limited-service Eating Places sector (NAICS 7222). 
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in a sealable envelope and contained a detailed instruction sheet. The respondents were asked not 
to disclose their full names (or their individual worker I.D. numbers) so that their identity was 
completely anonymous. They were also assured that the managers would not read or be able see 
their surveys. In approximately two weeks (times varied), the managers collected the surveys in 
the sealed envelopes and mailed the package back to the researchers. Upon receiving a package 
from a manager, a $50 gift certificate was mailed as―thank you‖ for manager‘s cooperation. 
Receiving a gift certificate was not conditional on the number of surveys completed or their 
quality. The response rate was 81.4 percent for managers and 54 percent for the individual 
employees.  
The manager survey was structured as follows. In the first section, managers were asked 
a series of open-ended questions about cost-saving strategies in different areas of business 
operation, including human resource (HR) practices, operational efficiency, non-labor costs and 
customer service. The goal was to assemble evidence on how MW mandate can affect business 
along several dimensions from a perspective of a manager. In the second section, we examine 
each cost-saving strategy in greater detail. The list was partially based on alternative theoretical 
models but mainly on our face-to-face discussions with managers and franchisee owners. The 
goal was to document which internal adjustments managers plan to use or have already used to 
offset higher costs due to the MW increase. 
Employee descriptive characteristics 
A portrait of employee demographic characteristics is presented in Table 4A. The 
majority of hourly employees are females, and 64 percent are African-Americans. Only 8 percent 
of workers are of Hispanic ethnicity. The average age of worker respondents is 28 and only 23 
percent of respondents are in their teens. Smaller than expected share of teenager workers in the 
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fast-food workforce could reflect that teenagers have shifted away from fast-food jobs toward 
retail jobs; it could also reflect a short-term change due to the severe recession that causes more 
adult workers to take low-wage fast-food jobs. The level of educational attainment in our sample 
is relatively low, with almost half of all workers having a high school diploma or GED. It does 
not appear that there are many immigrant workers in our sample: only 5 percent report being 
born in Mexico. However, it is likely that this figure is understated if workers are reluctant to 
reveal their current immigration status. Not surprisingly, workers have very low family incomes: 
64 percent of respondents have total annual family income of less than or equal to $20,000, and 
38 percent live on less than 10,000 a year. Additional worker attributes can be seen in the table. 
Several questions explore the reasons for workers‘ preferences for staying at this job 
(Table 4B). A large majority of workers agree that the convenience of the store‘s location and 
costs of finding another job, including time and money, are primary reasons for staying at the 
current job. This finding implies that low-wage workers face significant labor market mobility 
constraints. Evidence also shows that wages, although important, are not the most important 
factor: social interactions with peer workers, a sense of being treated with fairness and respect, 
good work team and opportunity to move up in pay and position, play a major role in worker‘s 
job attachment. Workers generally seem to be pleased with their job: more than half (57 percent) 
of respondents consider their present job ―satisfying‖ and ―very satisfying,‖ and only 10 percent 
are not satisfied at all. 
Approximately 12 percent of our sampled restaurants are located in the Atlanta Metro 
Area, where relative costs are much higher. As one would expect, these stores are significantly 
smaller (20 workers on average, compared to 35 workers on average in other locations), and 
hourly earnings are substantially higher than in the rest of the sample. For instance, in June 2009 
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average hourly wage for employees from the Metro Atlanta sub-sample is $8.03 while it is $6.94 
an hour for other hourly employees. In terms of demographic characteristics of workers, there are 
some noteworthy differences: employees from the Metro Atlanta sub-sample are slightly older 
(16 percent are teenagers, compared to 23 percent in the rest of the sample), 32 percent are 
married (compared to 16 percent in the rest of the sample), and they are more likely to have 
dependents. However, the major difference is in the share of Hispanic workers—45 percent of 
workers from the Metro Atlanta sub-sample are Hispanic, compared to only 6 percent in the rest 
of the sample. A large share of these workers is first-generation immigrants: 31 percent of 
workers were born in Mexico, compared to only 3 percent in the rest of the sample. High 
prevalence of Hispanic workers in the Metro Area establishments is not surprising: immigrants 
tend to locate in larger urban areas with better employment opportunities and near already 
established immigrant communities with developed social networks. Although there is no 
significant difference in educational attainment levels between the two groups, workers in 
Atlanta sub-sample have on average 3 more months of tenure at the store. Interestingly, the two 
sub-samples also differ in their attitude toward their job: 60 percent of workers from the Atlanta 
Metro area consider their job to be ―long-term‖ (11 percent) or ―permanent‖ (49 percent), while 
42 percent of workers from the rest of the sample do (11 percent consider the job ―long-term‖ 
and 31 percent think of it as a ―permanent‖ position). In short, a sub-sample of establishments 
located in higher-cost urban area of Metro Atlanta employ a significantly larger share of 
immigrant labor (of Hispanic origin) with a stronger work attachment—which may be due to the 
limited labor market opportunities for this segment of labor force (due to insufficient English 
proficiency or other social barriers). 
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V. Estimation Strategy   
In this section we describe the specification of the MW variable, used in this study to 
measure compliance costs, and the estimation strategy for indentifying the employment and 
hours response to the three-stage MW increase.  
Measuring costs of MW compliance: the GAP variable 
The identification strategy uses the MW policy change and its effect on the 
establishment-level wage bill increase as the source of exogenous variation in wages. In order to 
identify the effect of MW increases on establishment-level employment and hours worked, we 
construct a measure of the relative cost-impact of the exogenous MW shock called GAP. 
Although other studies have used similar measures (Card & Krueger, 1994; Dube et al., 2007; 
Giuliano, 2009; Katz & Krueger, 1992), the GAP variable is differently specified in several 
important respects. The major difference is that we are able to exploit the micro-level nature of 
the data to construct a more precise measure of GAP based on the individual-level wages. 
Specifically, the GAP variable GAPjt is constructed using data from individual worker i at 
the restaurant j and at time t (pay-period). It measures the log change in unit j’s wage bill 
resulting from a MW increase, assuming individual workers‘ hours h stay fixed between period t 
and period t-1 (before and after the MW increase). Specifically, the GAP for restaurant j at time t 
is defined in the following way: 
 
GAPj,t = 1 + [(Σhi,j,t-1 · MWi,j,t – Σhi,j,t-1· Wi,j,t-1 ) / Σhi,j,t-1 · Wj,t-1] , 
  summed over workers i for whom Wi,j,t-1 < MWt 
and set to 0 for workers for whom Wi,j,t-1 ≥ MWt. 
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The numerator in the brackets is the change in the wage bill between time periods t-1 and t, 
keeping hours constant; the denominator is the original wage bill. Thus, by summing additional 
earnings for each employee (change in the wage rate times hours) required for compliance with 
the higher MW,  GAP measures the percentage increase in the total wage bill due to the MW 
hike. Adding 1 to the bracketed term converts this from a proportion to a wage ratio (say 1.15 or 
15%). Specifically, we use the natural log of GAP (e.g., ln(1.15) = .140) in order to estimate a 
double log model and employment elasticities with respect to GAP. The lnGAP (say .140) is a 
―percentage‖ or ―proportion‖ based on an intermediate base between the initial wages and 
subsequent minimum wage. If restaurant j in period t-1 was paying all employees above the new 
MW effective in period t, then GAP = 1 (and lnGAP = 0). After the MW increase, GAP also 
reduces to 1. Table 5 presents summary statistics of the GAP variable, expressed as a percentage 
(by subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100), defined at the establishment-level as an average 
during March-May of each year (i.e., prior to a MW-induced wage increase). The relative cost-
impact of the MW grows over time and is the strongest for last MW hike as a greater proportion 
of workers are affected. The average total wage bill in the sample increased: by 2.6 percent as a 
result of the first MW increase; by 4.6 percent as a result of the second MW increase; and by 6.8 
percent in 2009.  
The ―wage gap‖ measure used in this study differs from several similar measures used in 
other studies. Card and Krueger (1994) define their GAP as a proportional increase in the store‘s 
starting wage necessary to bring it to the new level. According to this definition, GAP reduces to 
the wage ratio (MWt/Wt-1), one plus the proportional difference between the new MW and the 
prior starting wage.  This variable provides imperfect information on the actual cost-impact of 
the minimum wage: one does not know how many workers are actually impacted by the 
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minimum wage, nor does one know the total cost of the increase since hours worked are not 
included and the actual amount of the required wage increase is not observed. In fact, Card and 
Krueger‘s ―wage gap‖ is a proxy for a relatively high- or low-cost store location. Recognizing 
the problems with Card and Krueger‘s GAP variable, Dube et al. (2007) define their measure as 
a share of workers affected by the city-wide minimum wage increase (their ―wage gap‖ variable 
is called ―treatment intensity‖). Although they are able to account for the quantity dimension of 
the minimum wage impact (i.e., the number of workers whose wages are raised), not accounting 
for the price dimension (i.e., by how much wages have to be raised) generates an imprecise 
measure of the cost shock due to the minimum wage mandate. Similarly, using simple averages 
(of wages and hours) would provide a noisy measure since largely unaffected workers with 
wages above the new minimum wage would, in effect, cancel out affected workers.  Since the 
GAP measure is based on individual-level data, this study is able to capture both cost (by how 
much each wage has to increase) and quantity (for how many workers the wages increase). In 
addition, we can examine the sensitivity of estimated minimum wage effects using less precisely-
defined GAPs, as well as several alternative ―expanded‖ GAP measures (by varying the months 
before and after the policy change at which GAP is calculated).  
Estimation strategy 
For the empirical analysis of the MW impact on employment and hours worked, this study 
uses store-level bi-weekly averages, compiled from individual payroll data. Variable definitions, 
as well as data sources, are presented in Table 6. 
The empirical strategy relies on the standard reduced-form employment equations: 
 ln(Ejct) = α0+ β ln(GAPjct) *MWt+ α1 ln(GAPjct) + α2MWt+λSalesjct-1 + γZct + εjct       (1a) 
ln(Hjct)  = α0+ β ln(GAPjct) *MWt+ α1 ln(GAPjct) + α2MWt+λSalesjct-1 + γZct + εjct       (1b) 
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where the dependent variable is either ln(Ejct), the log of the average employment in store j, 
county c during period t (bi-weekly) or the log of aggregate hours Hjct, the sum of regular and 
overtime hours.  MWt is a time treatment dummy equal to 1 for six months after each MW 
increase (i.e., August through January each year); it captures aggregate factors that could cause 
changes in hours and employment even in the absence of a policy change. The coefficient of 
interest is β, the interaction term of GAP and MW; it measures the impact of the proportional cost 
increase of the MW mandate on establishment employment (or aggregate hours) averaged over 
the months following the increase. The parameter β provides a measure of the employment 
(hours) elasticity with respect to the exogenous increase in mandated wages. The higher is the 
GAP, the larger is the cost-impact of MW on labor costs and the greater the predicted 
employment decline (β <0), as the competitive theory predicts. 
The log of GAPjct controls for any differences in anticipated MW effects prior to the 
annual July increases between high- and low-wage restaurants. However, recent empirical 
evidence by (Schmutte & Gittings, 2011) suggests that MW increase may have long-run effects 
on employment; hence, including the initial measure of the compliance costs in the equation for 
each year may be more appropriate (the average GAP over March-May in 2007 prior to the first 
increase)
23
. Salesjct-1 is monthly percent change in sales, converted to log points and lagged two 
months to account for potential bias from sales and employment being determined 
simultaneously. The sales variable is an imperfect measure of the product output since the 
number of actual purchases or transactions is not observed, and sales differences reflect variance 
                                                 
23
 Alternatively, under the assumption that the ―shock‖ of the first MW hike has little impact on stores‘ employment 
trajectories for the next two years, one should instead include GAPjct separately for 2008 and 2009 MW hikes. In my 
estimations I experiment with both specifications—with and without accounting for possible ―lingering‖ effects of 
the MW. Interestingly, different assumptions about the lag of the MW impact do not have a significant effect on the 
principal findings. 
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in the product mix or price differences across locations. Zct is a vector of time-variant county-
level characteristics reflecting supply and demand factors in local labor markets; these include 
county-level population density and total private sector employment minus employment at 
Accommodations and Food Services and Retail sectors
24
 which captures employment unrelated 
to changes in the two sectors most affected by the MW increases.  In addition, state and owner 
fixed effects are included to control for time-invariant differences across states and the three 
franchisee owners. Finally, εjct  is  modeled as a composite error term; specifically, εjct=μc+υjct 
where μc is a county fixed effect
25
; bi-weekly fixed effect,  λt, is assumed to be absorbed into the 
idiosyncratic time-varying error term υjct.  
A few additional econometric issues warrant mention. To allow for autocorrelation at the 
establishment level, we use panel-robust standard errors clustered on individual establishments. 
If autocorrelation is ignored, standard errors will be inconsistent and biased (Bertrand et al., 
2004; Cameron & Trivedi, 2005) 
Possibility of heterogeneous trends across counties (or states) over time is another 
potential source of bias. Previous studies based on county-level panel data have shown that 
without adequate controls for pre-treatment trends in employment growth—i.e., not controlling 
for a negative employment growth in counties which were relatively more affected by the MW 
increase—the estimated employment effects are biased downward (Dube et al., forthcoming). 
                                                 
24
 Other county-level controls which have been considered in previous studies are total county employment and 
earnings, unemployment rate and school enrollment rates (Addison et al., 2008). 
 
25
 Since the error term can be modeled to allow for county effect to be random, I also check whether different 
specifications result in significantly different standard errors. For instance, allowing time dummies to enter 
separately makes robust standard errors practically unchanged. Second, estimating the model as a fixed-effects 
model (which assumes that time-variant controls are correlated with the unit-of-observation fixed effects λj, creating 
a serial correlation in the error term and inconsistent standard errors due to heterogeneity bias) presents serious 
limitations in our context since it prohibits including establishment-level controls that change across establishments 
but do not change with time (state, county and franchisee owner fixed effects). Third, under the random effects 
model λj is assumed to be orthogonal to the regressors which is a strong assumption, given that any unobserved 
establishment characteristics are likely to be correlated with observed controls, such as sales. 
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There are two possible ways to address this problem. First, we can examine longer time trends in 
county-level employment to identify whether there are any obvious negative or positive trends in 
the years preceding the policy change. Second, in a regression analysis controlling for time-
varying county-level supply and demand shifters (due to the business cycle) mitigates this 
concern at least to some degree.  
Figure 7 presents county-level annual employment growth rates in the private sector from 
1990 to 2008. There is significant variation in employment growth in this period, with a strong 
positive growth in the early 1990s, followed by a steady decline until late 2001, a period of 
recovery and another decline starting around 2005—which also reflects nationwide trends. 
However, some heterogeneity in employment growth may be present depending on low/high-
income location. Panel B shows annual employment growth rates for three groups of counties, 
based on the size of the initial GAP in 2007. Although the general trends are consistent, there are 
a few notable differences across these three groups. Relative to the ―Least‖ affected group, the 
other two groups experienced an earlier and a more negative employment growth rate in 2002. 
However, in 2007 the first two groups of counties switched from a small positive growth rate of 
about 2 percent to a negative 3 percent in the following year, while the ―Most‖ affected group 
had a reverse trend: from a negative 1.5 percent to about 0 in 2008. Thus it is possible that during 
the time of the first two MW hikes, ―low-wage‖ counties are recovering faster from a period of 
negative and declining employment growth, relative to other counties. This exercise 
demonstrates that while county fixed effect control for the level differences across counties, it is 
also important to control for time-varying factors, such as changes in the overall employment, at 
the county-level.  
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VI. Principal Findings on Employment and Hours from Payroll Records 
 This section reports the main findings of the impact of 2007-2009 federal MW increases 
on employment and hours worked from restaurant payroll records. First, we present graphical 
descriptive evidence and then turn to the estimation results. 
Graphical grouped analysis  
Since cumulative averages across all establishments in my sample would conceal 
substantial variation due to differences in pre-MW levels and the size of GAP (compliance costs) 
across relatively high- and low-wage areas in Georgia and Alabama, establishments are grouped 
based on broadly similar anticipated MW impacts. Using the size of GAP averaged for March - 
May, 2007 (prior to the July MW increase), the sample is divided into three groups—least, 
middle and most affected. The ―least‖ affected group includes all zero GAP stores (no 
compliance costs from the first MW increase) and represents the lowest 25
th
 percentiles of GAP. 
The ―middle‖ affected group has GAP values between the 25th and bottom and the top 75th 
percentiles of GAP, while establishments in the ―most‖ affected group have GAP compliance 
costs in the top 75
th
 and up percentiles. Grouped analysis allows for a rough comparison of 
employment and hours across establishments with presumably different minimum wage 
compliance costs.  
 Figure 8 plots bi-weekly establishment-level average changes in actual hourly earnings, 
employment, average regular hours and overtime hours for the three groups of stores over the 
three-year period. In Panel A, one can see three distinct jumps in the average hourly earnings, 
coinciding with the three MW hikes. The least affected group of stores is largely unaffected since 
the average wage there was slightly above $7 during the whole study period; however, there is a 
pronounced increase in the average hourly wages following the third MW increase. Importantly, 
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there is no evidence of pre-adjustments in hourly wages prior to the MW increases
26
. The third 
MW increase in July, 2009 has the strongest effect across all three groups. Small increases 
around January-February in 2007 and 2008 are attributed to the performance-based raises for a 
significant portion of the workforce in our sample. According to the restaurant owners, 
performance-based increases were substantially reduced following the first two MW increases in 
July 2007 and 2008, and largely eliminated in the third year. This is consistent with evidence 
suggesting that a mandatory MW increase is partially offset by reduced wage growth from 
employer increases (Card & Krueger, 1995). 
In short, we observe that the three MW increases have a substantial exogenous 
―treatment‖ effect on the average hourly earnings during the study period but with substantial 
differences in the intensity across the sampled restaurants. The regression estimates of the MW 
impact on employment and hours will rely on outcome differences between restaurants with 
different sized compliance costs (varying GAP). Thus, in the Figure 8, one should focus on 
differences in outcomes between the least, middle, and most affected restaurant groups. 
Panel B presents average employment for the three groups of stores.  Despite substantial 
jumps in the average hourly earnings observed in Panel A, employment is stable across the three 
groups during the study period. Although there is a negligibly small decline after July 2008 and a 
slight increase in the average employment after July 2009, overall employment (35 workers on 
average) did not change significantly not only within a particular group of restaurants but also 
across groups with different compliance costs.  The least affected stores are on average smaller 
in size which is a sub-sample characteristic of establishments located in the higher-wage Atlanta 
Metropolitan Area. Some seasonal fluctuations in the average employment are also evident. 
                                                 
26
 Absence of pre-adjustments in hourly earnings is consistent with evidence from the managers and franchisee 
owners.  
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There are systematic increases in employment (and turnover) twice a year (in June-July and 
December-January) which are attributable to vacation leaves and voluntary turnover of teenage 
workers (who are more likely to be employed during summer and winter school breaks). 
Panel C shows average regular hours per worker across the three groups of stores. 
Although regular hours fluctuate substantially on a pay-period basis, there is no apparent trend in 
the average hours over the entire study period. The ―least‖ affected stores have the highest 
average hours worked, 55 hours bi-weekly per worker as compared to the middle and most 
affected stores with the average of about 46 hours worked. Finally, panel D shows the average 
overtime hours per worker. Although the average number of overtime hours is very small (one 
hour on average), there is a significant difference in the overtime hours among the three groups. 
In the two more affected groups, overtime work is practically non-existent, while it plays a more 
important role for the least affected group. However, the trend in overtime work is rather 
uniform across stores that experience differential impact of the minimum wage mandates. 
Graphical analysis demonstrates that despite significant increases in the average hourly 
wages brought by the federal MW increases from 2007 to 2009, there is no apparent difference 
in employment and hours worked, not only within each of the three groups of stores but also 
across groups that have experienced different cost-impact due to the MW compliance. Lack of 
significant differences in outcomes between the most and least affected restaurants is the first 
suggestive evidence that the MW increase did not produce a large change in employment or 
hours worked. Smaller effects, however, might be masked by other changes co-varying with the 
size of MW employment effects. Next we explore effects of the MW increases on employment 
and hours worked in a regression framework in order to account for important covariates of 
employment and hours.   
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Findings from regression analysis 
As a first step, we estimate simple equations based on changes over the six-month period 
before and after each MW increase, ignoring other sources of employment growth besides the 
three MW increases. The dependent variable is logged employment, and on the right-hand-side 
we include a ―treatment‖ dummy equal to 1 six months after each MW increase (August through 
January of the following year). The coefficient on the dummy variable provides a measure of the 
log difference in employment six month before and after each policy change. First we estimate 
the relationship without including any covariates (first 3 columns of Table 7). The results are 
similar to the visual evidence from the graphical analysis: there is a small decline in employment 
six months after the second MW increase in July, 2008, but there is no statistically significant 
relationship for the first and third MW hikes.  
Next restaurant, county and owner fixed effects are included to establish sensitivity of the 
first estimates to these variables (columns 4-12 in Table 7). Interestingly, the coefficient on the 
dummy variable is robust to the inclusion of the store fixed effects (columns 3-6), as well as 
county and owner fixed effects (columns 7-12). Adding store-fixed effects sharply increases R
2
, 
from zero to about .9. Notably, the magnitudes of the estimated employment effects are small, 
suggesting a small decline (of 1 to 3 percent on average) following July 2007 and 2008 MW 
increase and a small increase (of about 1 percent) following July 2009 MW increase although the 
effect is not estimated precisely. These results demonstrate that, although time-invariant controls 
for unobserved county, owner and store-level factors are important determinants of the levels of 
employment in our sample, they do not appear to sweep out unadjusted employment change 
correlations with the three MW increases. 
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Next the full model is estimated where we use the measure of compliance costs, GAP, 
along with a host of time-varying covariates that account for the supply and demand factors, to 
estimate the effect of the MW increase on employment (and total hours). As before, the impact is 
estimated separately in 12-month intervals (six months before and after each policy change). 
Estimates of β, the coefficient on the interaction term, ln(GAPjct) *MWt. in equation 1, provides 
the estimate of the employment (and hours) effect of the MW mandate. Specifically, the 
interaction term shows how the change in payroll costs of complying with the MW mandate 
affects employment six months after the MW hike, while keeping hours worked unchanged. The 
coefficient β may also be interpreted as employment (and hours) elasticity, since a double-log 
model is estimated.  
I address the issue of endogeneity of sales variable by using lagged instead of 
contemporaneous sales. However, it is not clear a priori what the ―correct‖ lag should be; 
therefore we explore several specifications with and without lagged sales variable and observe 
how this affects my results. The estimates are presented in Tables 8A-C. In this set of results we 
also assume that the MW increase does not have a substantial long-run effect that would extend 
beyond a 6-month period. The first notable difference from previous estimates is a sharp increase 
in the absolute value of the coefficient β. It is not precisely estimated for the first two estimation 
periods, corresponding to 6 months before and after 2007 and 2008 MW increases; however, β>0 
and is significant for the final MW increase in 2009 (in both employment and hours estimations). 
As expected, lagged sales variable has a consistently positive coefficient, but the relationship is 
not always significant. Since sales represent price times quantity, one should expect the 
estimated coefficient on sales to be less than one, as it is. In general, the results do not appear 
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sensitive to whether sales are lagged or not. However, in my preferred specifications sales should 
be lagged, but the choice of an appropriate length of a lag is ambiguous.  
The principal findings are presented in Tables 9A-C. These estimates are based on my 
preferred specification, where the sales variable is lagged 2 months (and 1 month in the hours 
equation under the assumption that adjustments in hours worked can be implemented relatively 
easier and faster than adjustments in employment); in addition, the initial GAP (prior to the first 
MW increase) is included to control for the lingering effects of the policy change that may 
extend beyond the 6-month period after the policy goes into effect in the end of July of each 
year. 
Despite this study using a more accurate measure of the relative strength of the cost 
shock due to minimum wage increases, the results are consistent with studies which find small 
labor demand elasticities, both positive and negative. For the first and the third MW hikes I 
positive employment and hours elasticities are uncovered (employment elasticities of +.13-.19 
and +.45 and hours elasticities of +.27 and +.3, for 2007 and 2009 respectively), but they are not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, it appears that the assumption regarding how long the 
effects of the MW increase last seem to matter the most for the estimates of the impact of the 
final round of MW increases in 2009. If the initial cost shock from the 2007 MW hike is ignored 
(columns 4, 7, 10 and 13 in Table 8C) and is assumed to not have a discernable effect on stores 
employment two years later, then the estimated elasticity of demand is positive, significant, and 
quite sizable (+.6 and +.35 for employment and hours, respectively).  If, however, the effect of 
the first MW increase is long-lasting (as suggested by recent evidence), the effect on 
employment (and hours) is still positive but no longer statistically significant (Table 9C). Hence 
this assumption appears quite important. 
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For the 2008 increase, we obtain negative but also statistically insignificant elasticity 
estimates of about -.2 (and +.16 for hours elasticity). We conclude that there is no statistically 
significant evidence that stores experiencing relatively greater wage bill increases reduce their 
employment in response to the minimum wage.  
In results not shown, we compare the estimates using our relatively precise GAP measure 
of dollar compliance costs with estimates from an identical specification, except that  GAP is 
replaced with a less precise treatment variable measuring the share of affected workers, similar 
to that used in Dube et al. (2007).  Both the sign and the size of the estimated effects are similar 
to those previously shown. While this study‘s GAP variable is the more precise measure of dollar 
compliance cost, the improvement is not sufficient to significantly change the estimated results. 
As for other control variables, monthly percent change in sales (expressed in logs) has a 
consistent positive and statistically significant impact on the dependent variable (the coefficient 
is insignificant in Table 9A). Using the two month lag in sales variable alleviates some concerns 
over endogeneity bias due to contemporaneously determined sales and employment. However, 
the magnitude of the estimated effect is not very sizeable (elasticities of about +.12 and +.07 for 
2008 and 2009, respectively). Other controls, including population density and private sector 
employment at the country level, are statistically insignificant in most specifications.  
The three-step increase in the minimum wage provides a unique opportunity for testing 
the applicability of the monopsony model. If monopsony were important for understanding the 
observed outcomes, we would expect to find a small positive employment adjustment after the 
first minimum wage increase as the wage moves from a sub-competitive level toward a 
competitive level. As the minimum rate is further increased and exceeds the competitive level, 
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we should observe employment reductions, in line with the competitive model as firms move up 
their labor demand schedule. However, the opposite pattern is observed.   
Overall, these results are consistent with a number of previous studies that find small 
employment elasticities, both positive and negative, but that are not statistically significant. Lack 
of statistical significance, however, does not imply lack of economic significance. In fact, the 
estimated employment elasticities are somewhat larger than in prior comparable studies, possibly 
due to a substantial heterogeneity in the way businesses respond to the higher MW. 
In addition, there is no evidence showing that the three-step MW increases had a 
discernable effect on the total hours worked. Possible explanations for these results have 
surfaced during semi-structured interviews with the store managers. According to store 
managers, lowering work hours may not be a viable strategy to recover payroll costs because 
quality of service can be negatively impacted which in turn may reduce customer flow and lower 
total output. In fact, one manager noted: ―Hours have always been allocated based on what it 
takes to serve the customer flow of the restaurant, not cost. The number of people employed is 
based on the number of hours that must be allocated to serving the customers. We have to 
employ enough people to fulfill the hours that we need in order to meet our service standards‖ 
(italics added). Thus once an optimum combination of employment-hours to serve a certain 
number of customers is reached, independent of the wage rate, managers may not be willing to 
lay off workers or reduced their work hours. Hence, cost recovery has to occur in other areas of 
business operations.    
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VII. Robustness Checks 
In this section we report results of several robustness checks. After accounting for a range 
of potential problems, the estimates presented in previous section remain largely unaffected. 
Ripple effect 
 Using the GAP variable to measure the relative cost-impact of MW increase on total 
labor costs is likely to understate the wage effect (and overstate the estimated employment 
elasticities) if workers for whom MW is non-binding also receive wage increases. Higher MW 
may create a spillover effect across the entire wage distribution if managers want to preserve the 
internal wage-tenure hierarchy and give raises to their more experienced or more productive 
workers. Empirical identification of the spillover effect due to MW increases is challenging due 
to the presence of regular performance-based increases, which also coincide with July increases 
due to the MW mandate
27
. Since it is impossible to observe what the performance-based 
increases would have been in the absence of the MW increase, the two effects cannot be 
effectively separated. 
28
 One way to address this issue is to identify workers for whom MW is 
non-binding prior to the MW increase and then examine how their wages change in the course of 
the year.  Adding the ―ripple‖ effect and the GAP variable creates an upper bound for estimating 
the cost-impact of MW increase on labor costs since it assumes that their wage increases would 
have been zero absent the MW. 
                                                 
27
 Prior to the three MW increases, performance-based wage re-evaluations were performed for all hourly crew 
members in our sample twice a year, typically in January-February and in June-July. After the first MW hike, 
however, most of the establishments converted to one annual increase for crew members with hourly wages below 
the required minimum to coincide with the July MW mandated increase. For higher-paid workers, increases were 
given according to the pre-MW schedule (in the beginning of the year and then in July-August). 
 
28
 In principle, we could make an assumption about what performance-based increases would have been if MW were 
not increased (3 to 4 percent, for instance). We could then subtract that measure from the ―ripple‖ effect to separate 
increases due to MW only. 
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The ―ripple‖ effect is defined similarly to the GAP variable: it measures the percent 
increase in the total wage bill due to pay raises received by high-wage workers throughout the 
first half of the year, assuming that their hours worked remain the same. Table 10 presents 
summary statistics for the ripple effect. The cost of complying with the MW regulations, 
captured by the GAP variable, is higher than the cost of providing higher-paid workers with the 
annual raises. In addition, in line with expectations, the two wage effects move in the opposite 
direction: as the cost of MW compliance increases each year, pay increases for employees above 
the new minimum fall since the managers‘ ability to offer extra pay to their higher-wage workers 
diminishes.
29
 
The results of estimating reduced-form employment and hours models using the upper 
bound of the GAP variable are presented in Tables 11A-C. The upper bound is equal to the sum 
of GAP and the percent increase in the wage bill due to wage increases that are not required to 
comply with the MW mandate. There is no significant change in employment elasticities or the 
estimated coefficients of other control variables as compared to earlier results. As expected, the 
estimated employment elasticities are slightly lower than our earlier results. Although our 
primary results overstate the employment effect, any bias is very small and does not affect the 
primary conclusions.  
Another alternative for capturing the spillover effect of the MW increase across the wage 
distribution is to use the actual growth in the wage bill; this ―expanded‖ definition of the GAP 
variable measures the share of wage bill increase at a fixed point before and after the MW hikes 
                                                 
29
 Considering that the spillover effect is smaller, the bias is from understating the cost-impact is expected to be 
relatively small. In addition, one would be more concerned if the bias would work in the opposite direction—biasing 
employment elasticities downwards, instead of upward. 
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(between June and August), while keeping hours worked constant
30
. Estimating the main 
equations using the ―expanded‖ definition of GAP did not result in noticeable changes to 
employment and hours elasticities (results are not shown). 
Extended hours mandate 
 In March of 2008, the corporate office of the restaurant chain issued a requirement for all 
franchised restaurants to stay open for additional hour Sunday through Wednesday and for an 
additional two to three hours Thursday through Saturday.
31
 Businesses struggled to generate 
sufficient revenue to cover the costs of complying with this mandate,
32
 and the franchise owners 
launched an aggressive campaign to revoke the requirement. As a result, in August of the same 
year the hours requirement was lifted for Thursday nights, and stores were eligible for an 
exemption from the rest of the mandate depending on the hours of direct competitors in the 
area.
33
 A total of 29 stores in my sample filed for and received an exemption
34
 but even these 
stores had to extend their hours of operation for at least one hour, from 11pm to midnight.   
 Longer store hours might directly increase total employment or hours, or have some 
offsetting effects via adverse effect on store‘s profits. Alternatively, stores that received an 
                                                 
30
 Other fixed points in time could also be used. However, since ―expanded‖ GAP is still based on individual worker 
records (each workers contribution to the higher wage bill, aggregated at the store level), a balanced ―panel‖ of 
workers had to be used to perform calculations (i.e., each worker had to appear on a payroll both before and after the 
MW hike); extending our months of reference (say, to March and October-November) is possible, but given a high 
turnover rate, would require that hours worked, as well as wages, would have to be averaged at the store level, 
lowering the precision of the estimate.   
 
31
 About 10 restaurants in our sample were already operating at or near the required hours. Unfortunately, we could 
identify them exactly. 
 
32
 The minimum staffing requirements for the ―late hours‖ is two hourly crew workers and one manager, implying a 
total increase of approximately 18 hours per pay period.  
 
33
 Specifically, a store could request an exemption if its competitor within a one mile radius was not open for late 
hours. 
 
34
Three stores in our sample received an exemption much later (2 received it in summer 2009 and one in September-
October, 2009). Exact dates are not available. 
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exemption were better positioned to address the cost-impact due to the MW increase, relative to 
stores that were not exempt. Both responses can potentially contaminate our estimates. 
Considering these various scenarios, the impact of this mandate on the estimates of MW impact 
is difficult to disentangle.
35
 One way to test for the effect of the mandate is to compare 
employment and hours changes between stores that did and did not receive an exemption. 
Figure 9 shows total hours worked for stores exempt and non-exempt from the corporate 
mandate. From the end of February through early March 2008 there is a ―spike‖ in total hours for 
exempt stores. However, hours worked (both total and average) fall close to pre-mandate levels 
by the end of May—which can be due to adjusting daytime work hours. Beginning in June, there 
is a sharp reduction in total hours for stores that were granted an exemption, reaching minimum 
in August, as one would expect. Stores that were not exempt also experience decline in total 
hours which reflects a high degree of seasonal volatility in hours worked. After August, 
however, the difference in hours worked between the two groups diminishes and is not 
significant.  
The effect of mandated hours increase on employment (and hours worked) can also be 
analyzed in a regression framework using three-way interactions. Specifically, we test whether 
employment in stores that were not exempt from the longer operating hours mandate after the 
MW increase (beginning in August 2008) were affected differently than stores that were exempt, 
holding other controls constant. Therefore, we are interested in the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction variable, NOEXT*lnGAP*MW2, where NOEXT is a binary variable equal to 1 if a 
restaurant is in the non-exempt group. Results are presented in Table 12 (two-way interactions 
are also included but not shown). Although the sign of the estimated coefficient is negative as 
expected, it is not statistically significant. Alternatively, one can exclude the stores that were 
                                                 
35
 When asked, franchise owners disagreed as to whether the mandate was a significant problem. 
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exempt to smooth the variation in hours worked; estimated effects using sub-sample of stores do 
not change earlier findings (results are not shown).  
In short, it appears that potential bias from the longer hours mandate is very small and it 
does not affect the previous conclusions.  
Further considerations 
 Another potential bias may arise due to the restricted franchise ownership of the sampled 
stores. Since there are only three franchise owners, it is important to ensure that the results are 
not driven by idiosyncrasies of one franchise owner.  To address this problem, we re-estimate the 
preferred model using stores owned by one franchise owner (representing roughly 75 percent of 
establishments in my sample); the results, presented in Tables 13A-C, support the robustness of 
earlier findings. Although the estimated employment elasticity is never significant, the 
magnitude of the effect is non-zero, underscoring the high degree of variation in compliance 
costs across the sample located in high and low-wage areas. Excluding metro-Atlanta stores (as 
shown in Tables 14A-C) does not affect the primary results; the estimated employment 
elasticities follow a similar pattern as in previous estimates: β is negative for the first and second 
MW hikes; the coefficient is positive for 2009 MW increase, but none of the estimates are 
statistically significant. This exercise suggests that lowering the degree of variation in 
compliance costs—homogenizing the effect by restricting the sample to one franchise owned 
store or rural and semi-urban areas— lowers the precision of the estimates and does not lead to 
different findings.  
Finally, we examine the cumulative effect of all three stages of the MW mandate over an 
entire three-year period by looking at changes in employment (logged) from January, 2007 to 
December, 2009. Hence, for each establishment there are only 2 observations: 6 months before 
54 
 
 
 
2007 MW increase and 6 months after the last stage of the MW increase in 2009. To measure the 
―cumulative‖, balanced panel of stores is used, along with store and owner fixed effects. Results 
are presented in Table 15. The coefficient on the GAP variable—which represents the total cost 
impact from all of the three MW increases—is positive but not significant for the employment 
equation (column 1) and it is marginally significant at the 10 percent level in the estimate for 
aggregate hours.  
In summary, despite examining a sample of establishments that were substantially and 
differentially impacted by the minimum wage mandates, statistically significant employment and 
hours reductions in response to the MW increases could not be found. There is weak evidence of 
a positive employment effect following the 2009 MW increase, but this result does not hold if the 
dynamic, long-term effects of MW on employment are incorporated into the analysis. 
Importantly, the size of the estimated employment (and hours) elasticities is nontrivial 
and somewhat large relative to the estimates from similar studies.  Given that these estimates are 
based on arguably highly accurate observations, it is highly unlikely that this is the outcome of 
‗noisy‘ data.  Instead, somewhat higher-than-expected elasticities may reflect a high degree of 
heterogeneity in individual restaurant responses to the MW increases. Next section explores in 
greater detail a number of non-employment mechanisms which help to offset the higher labor 
costs due to the MW mandate.  
VIII. Non-Employment Channels of Adjustment from Payroll Records 
“[To] control cost we cannot simply reduce labor hours because customers still have to 
be served within the standard amount of time. We have to raise prices or recover our cost 
in other areas of the operation.”- Restaurant manager 
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The finding of insignificant positive, as well as negative, employment effects as a result 
of the MW increases is not atypical in the recent MW literature.  It leads to a puzzle: if 
employment and hours remain relatively stable, firms must find other ways to absorb and offset 
higher labor costs. 
This section addresses this question by exploring a range of adjustment mechanisms. 
Drawing evidence from several sources, we explore a comprehensive list of adjustment channels. 
Some of these adjustments—such as price increases—have received considerable attention from 
researchers, while others—such as lower turnover rates—have not been well-documented in the 
minimum wage literature. Next we turn to manager survey data for additional evidence on the 
adjustment channels.  
Output prices  
The standard perfectly competitive model predicts an increase in the output price in 
response to a binding MW. Businesses shift the burden of higher costs onto consumers, which 
eventually lowers demand for the product and reduces profits. An alternative view, the so-called 
―hungry teenagers‖ hypothesis, holds that higher earnings of low-wage workers may stimulate 
the demand for fast-food. The overall effect on the fast-food industry from a theoretical 
standpoint is therefore ambiguous. Empirical work generally supports the price pass-through 
hypothesis (see Lemos, 2008 , for a thorough discussion of the price-effect studies).  
If there is a full pass-through, price increase should be proportional to the share of MW 
labor (affected workforce) in total factor costs, assuming a constant returns to scale production 
function. Given that the wages increased by about 41 percent (from $5.15 to $7.25/hour), and 
assuming that labor share of total costs is one third, and approximately half of all workers have 
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been affected, holding other factors constant, the expected (cumulative) price increase over the 
three years is 6.7 percent. 
Price increases enacted for one of the most popular menu item, homogeneous among the 
stores, by the three owners are summarized in Table 16
36
. The total price increase is close to the 
expected estimate. The differences, both in terms of the average percent increase and the timing 
of price increases, are due to: 1) significant cost variation across establishments located in 
high/low income areas; 2) different strategies used by the owners for determining the price 
increase; 3) local competition and other unobserved factors.  
Strategies used to determine price increases (learned from personal interviews) are not 
uniform among the three franchise owners in my sample. The price setting mechanism is a 
combination of two crucial factors: 1) food costs; and 2) competitor‘s pricing. One owner 
reportedly uses a formula in which food input cost is a fixed share of the price. Another owner 
calculates a share of the price increase necessary to fully offset higher costs of labor due to the 
MW hikes: ―It is hard to measure if we were able to generate enough sales increase to cover the 
increase labor cost but we tried to estimate how much the minimum wage would cost us. If we 
thought it was $3,000 for a store for a month, we tried to figure out through price increases how 
to generate another $3,000.‖ In a large share of sampled establishments, prices for similar menu 
items are adopted from the closest competitor or a market leader; as one owner stated, ―the most 
important determinant is competitor prices. The only rule we have is to not have higher prices 
than our primary competitor.‖ Interestingly, some prices—such as soda drinks—actually fell to 
maintain competition. Finally, the least structured way of determining the price increase does not 
involve the actual computation of the costs but a rough assessment of ―consumer sensitivity.‖ In 
                                                 
36
 Prices were increased for a variety of menu items. Only one item is presented for an easier comparison and 
interpretation.  
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setting prices, one owner appears to have a reasonably good sense of the demand curve although 
he does not directly estimate it. In addition, when determining the price increase all three owners 
takes into account general economic trends, estimates of consumer confidence, etc.  
As Table 16 demonstrates, the ability to increase prices diminished over the three years 
largely because of the severe economic downturn. In fact, two owners did not make any 
significant price changes in 2009, citing a growing concern about sales declines. Another 
important limiting factor is the fixed price for the ―dollar-menu‖ items, which is set by the 
corporate headquarters and cannot be changed by the franchisee: ―dollar-menu‖ indirectly limits 
price increase for other items on the menu since customers are more likely to substitute away 
from the more expensive items to the items from the dollar menu.  
Unfortunately, data on profits and sales levels were not available. In fact, empirical 
evidence on the impact of the minimum wage on firm performance is scant
37
.   However, 
anecdotal evidence reveals that price increases in my sample were not high enough to maintain 
existing returns. All of the owners and managers we spoke to unanimously expressed their 
concern over declining profit margins. Figure 10 shows the share of labor costs in total sales for 
the largest subset of establishments in our sample; despite higher output prices, the labor cost is 
much higher than prior to the minimum wage increases. However, it is rather difficult to isolate 
the minimum wage impact from the recessionary pressures prevalent during 2007-2009, although 
fast-food restaurants were affected far less than were most sectors. 
Additional evidence for the anticipated impact on sales, profits, and overall business 
survival following the last MW hike comes from the managers surveys. Survey data reveals that 
only 17 percent of managers in our sample consider MW increase to be a significant worry for 
                                                 
37
 A notable exception is a study by Draca et al. (forthcoming), examining firm profitability of low-wage (residential 
care) firms after the introduction of national minimum wage in the U.K. 
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theirs stores survival and profitability, while 41 percent think MW will not have much effect on 
these outcomes. Most of the mangers also agree that sales will not fall significantly as a result of 
higher product prices, raised to offset the MW increase: only 11 percent of managers believe that 
sales will fall significantly  
Wage compression and wage distribution 
A higher minimum wage paid to the lowest-wage workers may limit wage growth of 
higher-wage, more experienced workers. On the other hand, managers may boost their wages in 
order to preserve internal tenure/wage hierarchy in order to retain their more experienced 
workers and maintain their morale. Evidence presented here suggests that the former 
predominates. In Table 17 the average wage increase is compared between the group of workers 
for whom MW is binding and those for whom it is non-binding. The data reveal that workers at 
the higher end of wage distribution received smaller absolute pay increases, and their relative 
position in the wage distribution is worse than prior to the MW hikes. Figure 11 shows changes 
in the wage distributions between low and high-wage workers, before (March-May) and after 
(August-December) each of the three MW hikes. The wage distributions shift significantly to the 
right for the low-wage workers, with the high frequency for workers getting the minimum rate. 
For higher-wage workers, however, the distribution barely shifts, and the change practically 
disappears after the July, 2009 increase. These results are consistent with wage compression 
uncovered in other studies (Dube et al., 2007) suggesting that gains due to ME increases are 
distributed from high- to low-wage workers.
38
  
                                                 
38
 Evidence on wage compression from the payroll records is also supported by managers‘ responses to a series of 
open-ended questions. Specifically, managers were asked what, in their opinion, was the most negative aspect of the 
MW increase. Interestingly, an overwhelming majority of managers cited wage compression and its adverse effects 
on the higher-wage workers‘ morale as one of the most negative results of the MW increase. Managers repeatedly 
expressed their concern over being unable to offer sufficient increases to their ―veteran‖ workers in order to preserve 
their relative earnings: ―Employees that are walking in off the street make just a quarter less than veteran 
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Turnover rates 
Higher earnings due to the MW mandate may lower voluntary quits of affected workers, 
partially by having a positive impact on their morale, and therefore reduce vacancies
39
. The firms 
may also benefit from savings generated through lower hiring and training costs. Empirically, the 
link between higher MW mandate and lower labor force turnover has not been well documented 
(Fairris & Reich, 2005; Reich et al., 2005 for the living wage ordinances).  
One can apply duration analysis to examine turnover rates, or the average spell of 
workers at the stores, over the three-year period
40
. The actual length of employment is difficult to 
estimate due to censoring and truncation. Left censoring occurs because we do not observe each 
worker‘s entry (we only observe entry of workers that were hired after January, 2007). Right 
censoring occurs because our observation terminates in December, 2009 while employment still 
continues. In addition, interval censoring arises because we only observe individuals that appear 
on the payroll every two weeks and do not observe those that were hired and left the job between 
the sampling periods, understating the number of very short spells. Left censoring may in part be 
addressed by considering only the ―new hires‖—workers that enter the sample for the first time 
after mid-January, 2007
41
. Using this definition, a high turnover rate is observed, as is common 
                                                                                                                                                             
employees‖; ―Newer team members are making almost as much as people who have been here for years, [causing] 
some hostility.‖ As one would expect, strong wage compression may disrupt cohesion of the workforce as higher-
wage/more experienced workers feel that they are being treated unfairly. 
 
39
 Manager survey responses confirm the positive effect of higher earnings on workers‘ morale. When asked to 
comment about the most positive aspect of the higher MW (open-ended question), lower turnover/attrition rates was 
by far the most common response. 
40
 The ―failure event‖ in this case is falling out of the sample; if a worker is not observed in the same store location 
for two or more months and then returns to work, the payroll records count the person as two distinct workers.   
 
41
 Even then, someone observed in mid-January may actually be a new hire but would not be included in the ―new 
hire‖ group. 
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in fast-food sector: the median ―survival‖ in the sample is approximately three and a half months 
(7 pay periods).
42
  
Turnover rates may or may not vary between high- and low-wage stores. On the one 
hand, restaurants with greater cost-impact due to the MW hike could benefit from relatively 
lower turnover rates; on the other hand, the composition of workers in higher-wage stores (more 
experienced workers) may also be correlated with low turnover. Figure 12 plots the Kaplan-
Meier survival curves for the two groups of stores (using the GAP variable to define stores 
relatively unaffected by the MW increase).  There is no evidence that the two groups of stores 
have any significant difference in their survival spells. 
Next, we estimate multivariate survival time model to examine the relationship between 
the length of individual worker spells, prior to exit from the sample, and several important 
covariates. Specifically, the standard hazard function for worker i can be written as:  
 , where  or 
 , 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard; Xi  is a vector of individual characteristics, including the 
average wage, regular and overtime hours, and store-level characteristics, including the cost of 
compliance to the MW mandate (prior to the 2007 MW increase) and average employment; and 
 is a vector of regression coefficients that includes an intercept term. The term  scales the 
baseline hazard multiplicatively by the same amount for each value of t.  Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to match individual worker characteristics from the employee survey to payroll data, 
limiting the ability to examine how personal demographic characteristics may affect the length of 
                                                 
42
 This measure ignores the shortest spells, i.e if a worker appears on the payroll only once. If the same worker re-
appears in the sample at the same restaurant for only one pay period, this spell is also ignored; the intervals between 
spells for the same worker are treated as separate spells (different unique identification number). 
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individual spell. We compare the results from the parametric regression survival-time model 
(Weibull) and the semi-parametric Cox model. The results are similar (Table 17). The estimates 
suggest that the hazard rate is increasing over time at a decreasing rate (1<p<2). As expected, 
there is a negative association between the average wage and the hazard rate: high-wage workers 
have lower conditional hazard rates (and hence longer survival times), ceteris paribus. It also 
appears that the hazard rate is increasing at the stores with larger size of the workforce; this 
could relate to lower relative costs of quits due to worker-worker substitution. Finally, at stores 
that experience greater cost-shock induced by the MW increase, the survival times are longer, 
but the magnitude of the effect is small: in the Weibull model, the elasticity of the hazard rate 
with respect to GAP is -0.012; implying that a 10 percent increase in GAP lowers the hazard rate 
by 0.12 percent. 
Alternatively, turnover can be measured as a share of total workforce observed in pay 
period t-1 but not observed in period t. According to this definition, if all workers are present in 
two consecutive pay-periods in a given restaurant (not counting new hires), the turnover is equal 
to zero
43
. Figure 13 plots the averaged shares of workers missing from the consecutive payrolls 
for the entire study period. The average turnover defined in this way is quite high—
approximately 8 percent over 3 years. Interestingly, over the entire study period there is a 
downward trend in turnover rates, more pronounced after the second MW increase in July, 2008. 
The turnover rates are not stable throughout the year: a spike in turnover occurs around July in 
2007 and 2008, followed by a sharp decline; there is another relatively smaller ―spike‖ around 
December-January, paralleling the observation of employment fluctuations depicted in Figure 8 
                                                 
43
 However, the turnover is likely to be overstated because short leaves due to sickness or longer leaves due to 
vacation are not accounted for. 
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(changes in employment at these times of the year are related to high school students working 
more during their summer and winter school breaks). 
In sum, analysis of the payroll data suggests that, despite high turnover rates across 
restaurants in my sample, average turnover decreased between January 2007 and December 
2009. The causal relationship between higher MW rates and lower turnover is difficult to 
establish. Results from estimating parametric survival time model and the Cox model imply that 
the size of the compliance cost with the MW increase is associated with reduced hazard rate 
(longer employment spells) for individual workers, ceteris paribus, but the effect is relatively 
small. A conservative assessment of the available evidence suggests that the decline in worker 
turnover between 2007 and 2009 observed in the sample may reflect a combined effect of several 
factors, including severe economic recession that began in late 2007, the sharp decline in quits 
economy-wide, poor alternative opportunities in the job market, and increased job attachment 
due higher earnings. 
IX. Non-Employment Channels of Adjustment: Manager Response 
The most important decision [for me] is to have the right manager. - Franchise owner 
In this section, we examine additional qualitative evidence on channels of adjustment to 
higher MW by examining survey data from the manager surveys. Managers have much 
discretion in their decision of how to recover some of the revenue lost due to a MW hike. 
Although the sample is too small to perform formal analysis, descriptive evidence from manager 
surveys offers valuable insights into the realm of business operations which is largely absent 
from the MW debate. Interestingly, managers believe they can offset on average (with relatively 
high variability) 20 percent of the weekly cost increase due to the MW hike—which equals to 
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approximately $224 in weekly savings—by applying cost-saving measures unrelated reduction in 
labor force. This suggests that savings from other adjustment channels are non-negligible. 
To frame this discussion, we use the expanded definition of efficiency first elaborated by 
Harvey Leibenstein in 1966. His major insight into the existing economic theory was that 
economic agents—because decision-making is costly and burdensome—may not act as to 
achieve maximum efficiency in their productive decisions and behavior. The term X-efficiency 
(or X-inefficiency) describes the difference between efficient behavior assumed in the economic 
theory—i.e., constrained optimization to solve for the highest value of the objective function—
and the actual observed behavior. As a result, the firm operates inside its production possibilities 
frontier: ―Firms and economies do not operate on an outer-bound production possibility surface 
consistent with their resources. [...] This means that for variety of reasons people and 
organizations normally work neither as hard nor as effectively as they could‖ (Leibenstein, 1966, 
p. 413). There are many possible sources of X-inefficiency, including principal-agent relations, 
degree of competitive pressures in a firm‘s product market and the regulatory regime in which a 
firm operates (Button & Weyman-Jones, 1992). Although X-inefficiency theory has been 
interpreted by some researchers as the antithesis to the conventional competitive model, these 
concepts may be reconciled with the standard neoclassical theory if it is expanded to incorporate 
such concepts as motivational differences, endogenous effort, or changing preferences for leisure 
(Rozen, 1985). 
In the context of the fast-food industry, X-inefficiency implies that management may not 
always maximize profits by maximizing the difference between revenues and costs. In the 
presence of positive costs to achieve efficiency due to asymmetric information, moral hazard, 
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and motivational slack, among other things, managers are more likely to improve efficiency as 
the relative costs of slack rise with higher mandated wages.  
Manager characteristics and hours worked 
Table 19 presents descriptive characteristics of restaurant managers. Interestingly, 
managers perceive a majority of their workforce as over-qualified for the job. There is a great 
variation in managers‘ experience levels: respondents have on average over 10 years of 
professional experience but with much variation—an important element indicating that managers 
are heterogeneous in terms of their skills. 
 Managers are incentivized
44
 to maintain their labor costs at a fixed share of the sales 
value
45
; hence managers may be inclined to reduce their own hours worked to maintain labor 
costs. Figure 14A plots monthly averages for regular and overtime hours worked (Figure 14A) 
using a sub-sample of restaurants which report managers‘ hours in the payroll for hourly 
workers.
46
 Regular hours and overtime hours worked for managers are stable during the entire 
study period. Managers work on average slightly above 160 hours a month (approximately 40 
hours a week working full time) and also report on average 20 hours in overtime (approximately 
five extra hours a week). Figure 14B plots the average hours worked for the two groups of stores, 
based on the GAP measure. There is no significant difference between managers‘ hours in stores 
that experienced a different cost-impact due to the MW increases. It appears that, at least in a 
sub-sample of establishments, managers did not reduce their own work hours to offset the 
increasing labor costs due to the MW compliance. 
                                                 
44
 This is an operational mandate made by the owner to manager. 
 
45
 Although most of the managers are salaried employees, some assistant managers are paid on an hourly basis. 
 
46
 Only 16 restaurants report managers‘ hours as part of their electronic payroll records.  
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Cost-saving adjustments in response to the MW 
Using behavior models of labor markets as a starting point, and including suggestions 
from the store managers and franchisee owners, 23 potential cost-saving measures were 
identified in the following areas: human resource practices, operational efficiency and 
productivity, non-labor costs and customer service. The goal was to identify which cost-saving 
strategies are perceived by managers as the most effective at reducing costs induced by the final 
2009 MW increase. Managers were asked whether they use a particular strategy and if so, they 
rated it on the scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most cost-effective. Descriptive results are 
presented in Table 20 and the distribution of rated answers is presented in Figures 15A-C. 
Provided below is a summary of what the data reveal. 
Human Resource (HR) practices 
Cost-savings may be obtained by adopting a number of changes in a store‘s HR practices. 
Several such measures were identified, including reduced training (as suggested by the 
competitive model), change in workers‘ demographic characteristics, part-time/full-time worker 
substitution, etc. Figure 15A shows that most of the managers (90 percent) plan to increase 
performance standards; this measure also ranks high in terms of anticipated cost-savings. 
―Higher performance standards‖ is a more general term which can include greater discipline 
from workers, less slack and more satisfactory performance of job duties. Sixty-nine percent of 
managers indicate that a change or adjustment to the work schedule is necessary to offset higher 
costs of labor. Adjusting schedules requires a solid understanding of how store‘s sales fluctuate 
throughout the day in order to allocate appropriate number of workers during peak and off-peak 
hours. In terms of part-time/full-time substitution, the effect is unclear: most of the managers do 
not consider changing the number of either their part- or full-time crew members to be important 
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cost-saving strategy. Only 15 percent of managers expressed interest in hiring more teenage 
workers: this ambivalence is related to the fact that teenagers, who are typically high school 
students, have less flexibility in their schedules.  
Interestingly, only 10 percent of surveyed managers plan to reduce training to their 
workers.  This is contrary to the prediction of the competitive model which posits that MW 
reduces on-the-job training because workers cannot accept lower pay to cover the cost of their 
training. In line with our earlier findings from the payroll data, we find that a significant portion 
of the cost burden due to the MW is shifted to the most experienced/higher-paid workers: 40 
percent of managers noted they would delay or limit pay raises or bonuses to these workers. 
Survey findings are also consistent with our previous evidence of no substantial 
employment and hours reduction. While 60 percent of managers consider lowering weekly hours 
to some employees, only 20 percent plan to lower their workforce to offset the higher cost—and 
only 8 managers (of 66 answering the question) consider this strategy to be ―somewhat‖ or ―very 
important‖ for cost-savings.47   
Operational efficiency and productivity 
 Store managers can affect operational efficiency in their stores in various ways. For 
instance, they may cross-train workers so that one worker can perform several tasks or rearrange 
duties for greater efficiency. They may also demand more effort from each worker or try to 
motivate the crew to work harder by increasing morale and team spirit.  In interviews, managers 
consistently stressed the importance of communicating to workers about challenges that they, as 
managers, face when the MW goes up. This accomplishes two objectives: first, it makes workers 
                                                 
47
 In fact, one manager noted: ―[Laying off workers] hurts our ability to serve customers which hurts our sales.‖  
Another manager pointed out that the fixed costs of hiring a new employee is quite high and only serious 
disciplinary problems are typically considered for lay-offs: ―[We] do not fire. They fire themselves.‖ 
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feel they are being treated fairly and with respect because their opinion and input matter, and 
second, increasing workers‘ effort and loyalty through awareness and team work ensures a 
smoother transition through the first few months after the MW increase. 
The significance of productivity-enhancing measures in terms of cost-savings is in Figure 
15B: 92 percent of managers have agreed that they work to increase morale and team spirit of 
their workers, while 60 percent of those who responded also consider it to be important for 
controlling their labor costs.   
Non-labor costs and customer service 
In addition to labor-related savings, managers can also save on non-labor inputs, namely 
utility and food costs. According to Figure 15C, this response was quite common. Almost all 
managers stated they plan to reduce or save electricity and water usage or have already done so, 
and 97 percent of managers planned to reduce food waste in preparation and storage. Both 
measures also are rated highly in terms of cost-reducing potential. This finding is at odds with 
textbook competitive theory. If it pays to adopt improved business practices, the question is why 
managers have not already done so. In personal interviews, managers generally agreed that there 
are costs to attaining higher efficiency—such as to insure that the stove is always turned off 
during slow business hours or that no extra bag of frozen hamburgers is ordered from a food 
supplier. The first improvement requires closer monitoring and stricter discipline from workers; 
the second measure requires expert knowledge of the exact amount of inputs to be used in a 
particular week. Often a manager may not even be aware of existing inefficiencies and wasteful 
resources that exist at his/her store until a cost increase impels attention to this matter. 
Finally, managers can stimulate customer demand by improving customer service in new 
and innovative ways. This may include special group discounts, raffles, new menu items, or 
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improved service quality (more ―smiling faces‖, as one manager told us). Managers may also try 
to reach out to various youth, sports or church groups in their community, although this measure 
seems to be less popular because it is more difficult and costly to design and implement.  
 Channels of adjustment: employee perspective 
Employees in our sample have expressed an overwhelming support for raising the 
minimum wage rate: 91 percent ―vote‖ in favor. One explanation is that workers may not be 
aware of the potential negative effect of higher wages on their jobs. Therefore, the study explores 
workers‘ perspectives on the mechanisms used to offset higher labor costs. Descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table 21. Workers appear to have a reasonably good understanding of the 
adjustments necessary to offset higher labor costs, and there is no significant difference between 
manager and worker responses. Forty-four percent of workers believe that at least one employee 
will have to lose his or her job as a result of higher labor costs. This is somewhat higher than one 
would expect given our earlier findings from payroll data and manager surveys. Thirty-six 
percent of the workers expect lower training as a result of the MW hike. Most of the workers 
agree that prices will increase and hours will be cut in order to offset the increased labor costs. In 
terms of workers‘ own effort and productivity, 74 percent believe that they will ―have to work 
harder and faster.‖ Although this evidence is only suggestive, it appears that higher MW does 
induce greater effort and productivity from workers. 
In sum, this study presents new evidence on adjustments that store managers state they 
will use to mitigate higher labor costs due to increased minimum wage when employment and 
hour adjustments have been exhausted or are limited. Using survey data, we find that cost-
controlling adjustments can be applied to many areas of business operation. Specifically, store 
managers identified the following channels of adjustments as being the most significant in terms 
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of their cost-saving properties: increasing performance standards for their workers and adjusting 
their work schedules; discouraging overtime work; cross-training workers for multitasking and 
increasing morale and team spirit for higher productivity; reducing food and utilities waste; and 
stimulating local demand through better customer service. Taken together, the cumulative effect 
of adopting these measures can generate significant cost-savings and help to offset costs after 
accounting for price increases, lower profit margins and other commonly identified responses. 
X.  Implications for the Theoretical Models of Labor Markets 
This study offers several implications for the theoretical models of labor markets 
discussed in Section II.  First, the primary findings of the adjustment channels appear to be 
consistent with several alternative models of labor markets.  
Evidence from the manager (and employee) surveys suggests that worker productivity 
and wage increases due to the minimum hikes are positively correlated, supporting the 
predictions of the behavior models of labor markets. For instance, managers have reported that 
higher performance standards, greater worker effort and increased morale were important 
strategies for offsetting higher labor costs.  
Lower worker attrition between 2007 and 2009 uncovered from the payroll records 
support the predictions of the labor turnover model. Results from the regression analysis also 
appear consistent with the institutional model, which assumes an indeterminacy area around the 
firm‘s labor demand curve. As Lester (1952, p. 264) put it, ―[there] is not one invariant 
employment reaction to wage change brought about by legal minimums, but varieties of 
employment and non-employment adjustment, especially within a moderate range of wage 
change‖ (italics added). The findings of both positive and negative, but insignificant, 
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employment elasticities, highlighted in this study, seem to suggest that the elasticity of labor 
demand may be contingent on the combined effect of the different channels of adjustment used 
by managers.  
Second, the empirical results in this study challenge the monopsony model which, until 
recently, has been commonly used to explain the small positive employment effects found in 
some minimum wage studies. Applying the monopsony framework to examine three consecutive 
minimum wage increases, one might expect to find a positive effect on employment following 
the first or the second minimum wage increase, possibly followed by a reversal in the sign of the 
estimated elasticity as the wages approach the competitive level; however, this there an opposite 
pattern uncovered in this study, albeit employment elasticities are not estimated precisely. 
Similarly, the regression results do not support the predictions of the standard competitive 
model.  
In sum, the results are consistent with a number of theoretical models of labor markets, 
but the distinction among various theories is not clear-cut. Hence, evidence presented in this 
study advocates for a more flexible interpretation of the standard competitive model—one which 
allows for a more flexible production function and incorporates additional margins of adjustment 
to the minimum wage increases and other market regulations.  
XI. Conclusion 
In the debate on the economic effects of labor market regulation much work has focused 
on minimum wages. Despite there being a large literature on the impact of the minimum wage 
laws on labor market outcomes, especially on employment, there is a surprising lack of 
consensus, not only about the size of the employment effect but also about the identification 
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methods. This dissertation examines the economic effects of the recent three-stage increase in the 
Federal minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 in 2007 through 2009. Using confidential electronic 
payroll records of individual workers from a sample of quick-service restaurants in Georgia and 
Alabama, we construct an improved measure of the cost impact of compliance with the 
minimum wage increases. Contrary to the standard competitive model, we do not find a 
significant reduction in employment or hours worked following the three minimum wage 
increases. The estimated employment and hours elasticities are both positive and negative but 
insignificant; the relative size of the estimated coefficients is non-trivial, possibly due to 
substantial heterogeneity in responses to the MW increases among the sampled establishments.  
Drawing on a broadened theoretical framework, this study explores a range of adjustment 
channels that help reconcile the paradox of small and insignificant employment (and hours) 
effects uncovered in prior studies. Higher product prices and lower profit margins appear to be 
the two most important adjustment mechanisms that enable firms to sustain the increased labor 
costs induced by minimum wages. In addition, wage compression and lower turnover rates help 
businesses mitigate higher labor costs.  
Additional evidence on adjustment channels, some of which have received little-to-no 
attention in existing literature, comes from the unique manager surveys. The descriptive analysis 
of manager survey data offers an insight into the ―black box‖ of small business operation. The 
results suggest that an indirect effect of the minimum wage is to increase efficiency in several 
areas of business operation; in addition, there is evidence that minimum wages have a positive 
impact on worker productivity through higher performance standards and improved morale.  
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This dissertation represents an important contribution to looking at the impact of labor 
market regulation on labor market outcomes and contributes to a more complete understanding 
of the effects of minimum wage laws on businesses and individuals. 
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Appendices 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. U.S. Federal Minimum Wage Rates: Nominal and Inflation-adjusted
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Figure 2. The Impact of a Minimum Wage in a Perfectly Competitive Labor Market: Covered 
and Uncovered Sectors 
A. Covered Sector 
 
B. Uncovered Sector 
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Figure 3. Wage Determination in a Monopsony Market and Effect of the Minimum Wage 
 
 
Figure 4. Efficiency Wage Model and the Impact of the Minimum Wage 
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Figure 5. Post-Keynesian Labor Market and Effect of the Minimum Wage 
 
 
Figure 6. Institutional Labor Market and Minimum Wage Increase 
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Map 1. Georgia and Alabama Sample of Quick-Service Restaurants 
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Figure 7. Annual county-level employment growth rate in the private sector, total versus grouped 
 
Notes: County-level data come from QCEW. Panel A shows annual employment growth rate in the private sector 
(calculations are based on a quarterly basis, i.e. 1990Q1 is compared to 1991Q1, etc.). Panel B shows annual 
employment growth rate in the private sector for the 3 groups of counties: ―Least‖ include counties in which stores 
from the sample were unaffected by the 1
st
 MW increase (lnGAP=0 for March-May in 2007); ―Most‖ includes 
counties in which stores from our sample are in the top 25
th
 percentile of being affected by the 1
st
 MW increase; 
―Middle‖ includes counties where the rest of the sampled stores are located. 
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Figure 8. Average hourly wage, employment and hours worked, January, 2007-December, 2009 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows establishment-level averages for: hourly earnings, employment, regular hours and overtime 
hours for 3 groups of stores by pay-period (bi-monthly). The first group of stores, ―Least‖ affected, includes stores 
for which lnGAP is equal to 0 for March-May 2007;  ―Middle‖ group includes stores between the bottom and top 
25
th
 percentiles of lnGAP distribution; ―Most‖ affected group includes stores in the top 25th percentile of lnGAP 
distribution. 15
th
 day of each month corresponds to the payroll data for the first half of each month; 30
th
 day of each 
month corresponds to the payroll data for the second half of each month. Vertical lines mark the MW increases. 
Horizontal lines in Panel A show the MW levels. 
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Figure 9. Average total hours worked, by pay-period, January 2007-December, 2009: Exempt 
versus non-exempt stores 
 
 
 Figure 10. Share of Labor Costs in Total Sales
 
1400
1450
1500
1550
1600
1650
1700
1750
1800
1850
1900
Exempt
Non-exempt
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
81 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Distribution of hourly wages: High and Low-Wage workers, before (March-May) and 
after (August-December) 2007-2009 MW increase 
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Figure 12. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates: low and high-GAP stores 
 
Notes: ―Least affected‖ categories includes stores for which GAP=0 in March-May, 2007; the rest stores are 
included in ―More affected‖ category. 
 
 
Figure 13. Average turnover of workforce: January, 2007-December, 2009 
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Figure 14A. Managers‘ regular and overtime hours (monthly averages) 
 
Figure 14B. Managers‘ regular and overtime hours (monthly averages): high and low-impact 
group of stores 
 
Notes. The figure shows average monthly regular and overtime hours worked of restaurants managers for two 
groups of stores: ―less affected‖ are stores for which GAP in March-May 2007 was in the lower 75th percentile 
distribution; ―more affected‖ are stores for which it was in the top 25th percentile of GAP distribution.  
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Figure 15A. Reaction to Higher Labor Cost due to MW increase: Human Resource Practices and 
Cost-Savings 
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Figure 15B. Reaction to Higher Labor Cost due to MW increase: Operational Efficiency and 
Productivity 
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Figure 15C. Reaction to Higher Labor Cost due to MW increase: Non-Labor Expenses/Customer 
Services and Cost-Savings 
 
Notes: Figures 14A-C show distribution of answers to Question 7 in the MGR survey. Specifically, each manager 
was asked to following question: ―Other research studies of the minimum wage have identified the following list of 
items as BUSINESS ADJUSTMENTS you might possible make in order to OFFSET the payroll cost increase 
associated with the higher minimum wage. Which of the following are you planning to do in the next 1-3 months 
OR have done already in the last month (please check YES or NO)? If your answer is YES, please rate the impact of 
your action for cost-saving on the scale 1 to 5 (1=least important; 5=very important). Please circle one number from 
1 to 5‖ Due to insufficient number of responses in some categories, the rating was redefined in the following way: 
―Not very important‖ if a respondent rated his answer 1 or 2; ―Somewhat‖ if a respondent rated his answer 3; and 
―Very important‖ if a respondent rated his answer 4 or 5.  
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Models of Labor Markets and the MW Effects 
  Perfect competition Structural Monopsony Behavioral  PK/ILE 
 
Labor Market Assumptions 
Demand curve 
Downward sloping; 
w=MRP 
No demand curve as 
customarily defined 
Separate demand for 
each wage rate; 
MRP(W) 
Ill-defined; resembles a 
"band" with 
discontinuities, 
positive/negative slopes 
Firm Supply 
curve 
Horizontal 
Upward sloping; 
MCL>S 
Upward sloping 
Upward sloping; separate 
supply for each wage rate 
Equilibrium 
Yes;  no involuntary 
unemployment 
Exploitation exists 
(w<MRP) 
Multiple equilibria;  
involuntary 
unemployment 
Inefficient; social cost of 
labor>private cost 
Predicted Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage Increase 
Employment 
Lower; (depends on the 
elasticity of demand 
curve); ambiguous if 
consider uncovered 
sector 
Higher/lower/unchanged Higher/lower/unchanged Higher/lower/unchanged 
Output prices Higher 
Possibly lower (in the 
short run) 
Ambiguous Ambiguous 
Worker 
productivity 
effort 
N/A N/A Higher Higher 
Labor turnover N/A N/A Lower Ambiguous 
On-the-job 
training (general) 
N/A N/A Possibly higher Possibly higher 
Non-wage 
benefits 
N/A N/A Ambiguous Ambiguous 
Aggregate 
demand/output 
Lower Possibly higher Ambiguous Higher 
Overall 
Misallocation of 
resources; a "tax" on 
consumers, firms, job 
losers 
Lowers exploitation; 
improves efficiency 
Positive "human" 
responses may offset 
negative efficiency 
effect 
In addition to 
monopsony/behavioral 
effects, also positive agg. 
demand and social cost 
effects 
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Table 2. Channels of Adjustment: Summary of Existing Empirical Evidence 
Response Adjustment Channel Predicted 
effect 
Empirical studies 
M
a
rk
et
  
Output prices 
O, M ↑ Lemos (2008) reviews approximately 30 studies; Aaronson et al. (2007) 
Business growth/profits/sales 
O, M ↓↑ Card and Krueger (1995); Draca et al. (2006) 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
M
a
n
a
g
er
  
(o
r 
o
w
n
er
) 
 
 
Employment 
P, M, O ↓↑, no 
change 
many; Neumark and Wascher (2007) provide a thorough review of more than a 100 studies; Card 
and Krueger (1992, 1994, 2000); Neumark and Wascher (1992, 2006); Burhauser et al. (2000); 
(Addison et al (2008); Dube et al (2008); Sabia (2009); Guilianno (2009) 
Hours worked (overtime)
 P, M ↓, no 
change 
Couch and Wittenburg (2000); Zavodny (2000); Dube et al. (2007); Sabia (2009); Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2008); overtime work: Fairris (2005)  
Turnover/Vacancies
 P, M ↓ Dube et al. (2007); Reich et al. (2005); Fairris (2005) 
Training 
M ↓↑ Card and Krueger (1995); Reich et al. (2005); Fairris (2005) 
Salary compression 
P, M 
- Card and Krueger (1994); Dube et al. (2007) 
Skill/Compositional changes
 M 
- Neumark and Wascher (1996); Burkhauser et al. (2000); Ahn et al. (2008); Reich et al. (2005); 
Zavodny (2008); Fairris and Bujanda (2008); Guiliano (2009) 
Employee benefits 
O ↓ Card and Krueger (1994); Dube et al. (2007) 
    
W
o
rk
er
 
Effort/improved 
morale/productivity 
M, E 
↑ Reich et al. (2005); Fairris (2005) 
Job attachment/lower turnover 
M, P, E ↑ See Manager response above 
Notes. Superscripted letters stand for the type of data used to analyze a particular adjustment channel: O stands for evidence from personal interviews with 
establishment owners; M stands for Manager Survey data; P stands for electronic payroll data; E stands for Employee Survey.
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Table 3. Summary statistics: Individual-level Payroll Records 
Year Payroll record N Mean 
St. 
dev. Min Max 
2
0
0
7
 
Hourly wage rate 63164 6.28 0.95 5.15 15.79 
Regular hours 63716 49.18 22.58 0.02 140.81 
Overtime work (dummy) 63718 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Overtime hours 63716 0.74 3.38 0 76.64 
 
      
2
0
0
8
 
Hourly wage rate 64764 6.68 0.84 5.85 12.29 
Regular hours 65291 49.27 22.3 0.02 124.57 
Overtime work (dummy) 65290 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Overtime hours 65290 0.63 3.15 0 55.9 
 
      
2
0
0
9
 
Hourly wage rate 63484 7.15 0.69 6.55 11.36 
Regular hours 63972 49.18 21.67 0.02 120 
Overtime work (dummy) 63975 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Overtime hours 63972 0.45 2.76 0 58.94 
 
Table 4A. Employee Characteristics from Employee Surveys  
Variable Obs. Mean St. dev. 
Gender  (female=1) 1649 0.657 0.475 
Race    
White 1595 0.207 0.405 
Hispanic 1595 0.082 0.275 
Black 1595 0.644 0.479 
Asian 1595 0.053 0.225 
Other 1595 0.014 0.117 
Marital status    
Single 1451 0.686 0.464 
Married 1451 0.175 0.38 
Divorced/widowed 1451 0.054 0.226 
Living with partner 1451 0.085 0.28 
N of children under 18 1625 0.958 1.3 
Age 1628 28.194 10.719 
School in Fall (=1) 1623 0.34 0.474 
Level of schooling    
Some high school 1611 0.273 0.446 
Finished high school/GED 1611 0.475 0.5 
Some college 1611 0.22 0.414 
College graduate 1611 0.032 0.175 
Health insurance (=1) 1618 0.406 0.491 
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Country of origin    
U.S. 1551 0.917 0.276 
Mexico 1551 0.05 0.219 
Other 1551 0.033 0.178 
Wage in June 1555 6.987 1.416 
Average hours per week 1568 29.51 8.309 
Tenure at store (in months) 1571 26.812 39.992 
No other  jobs 1592 0.832 0.374 
Total annual family income    
Less than 10,000 1541 0.382 0.486 
10-20,000 1541 0.263 0.44 
20-50,000 1541 0.276 0.283 
>50,000 1541 0.079 0.115 
Vote ―yes‖ for MW (=1) 1607 0.912 0.283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4B. Worker reasons for staying at the present job 
Reasons for staying at this job: N Mean St. dev. 
 The pay here is equal or better than at other jobs I can get 1544 56.1 49.6  
I like my job and the kind of work I do 1578 80.5 39.6  
Other jobs in this area are hard to get 1565 71.8 45  
I like the other people I work with 1567 88.8 31.5  
I get the work schedule here that suits my needs 1571 78.7 41  
I would have to start at a lower rate elsewhere 1551 41.4 49.3  
My managers are good to work for 1561 85.5 35.3  
There is good team spirit here 1571 73.3 44.3  
It takes time and money to find another job I would want 1574 80 40  
I like the way I get treated here 1562 77.3 41.9  
Benefits, like insurance, vocation, etc are good here 1569 74.4 43.6  
There is opportunity to move up in pay and position 1562 73 44.4  
The store location is convenient for me to get to 1570 88.3 32.1  
I can't afford to quit and miss a paycheck 1570 75.9 42.8  
I am better off staying here than going to a different job 1565 68.9 46.3  
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Table 5. Summary statistics of the GAP variable: compliance costs as percentage of payroll costs 
Year MW 
effect 
Mean St. dev. Min Max N of obs. 
2007 GAP1 2.598 2.083 0 8.150 2013 
2008 GAP2 4.640 2.628 0 9.157 2104 
2009 GAP3 6.805 2.638 0.115 10.639 1940 
Notes: Summary statistics for the GAP variable, which is the percentage increase in the store's wage bill, resulting 
from increasing hourly wage of workers to the new MW (for those workers whose wage in March-May is below the 
mandated  minimum), while keeping hours constant;  averaged for each store in March-May of each year 
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Table 6. Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Name Definition Source Formula Unit 
     Employment Total number of workers (with positive hours) author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
 
log 
Agg. hours Total number of hours worked (regular and overtime)  author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
 
log 
GAP Percentage increase in the store's wage bill, which results 
from increasing hourly wage of workers to the new MW 
(for those workers whose wage in March-May is below the 
mandated  minimum), keeping hours constant;  averaged for 
each store in March-May of each year 
author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
GAPj,t = 1 + [(Σhi,j,t · MWi,j,t – Σhi,j,t· 
Wi,j,t-1 ) / Σhi,j,t · Wj,t-1] , summed over 
workers i for whom Wi,j,t-1 < MWt 
and set to 0 for workers for whom Wi,j,t-1 
≥ MWt log points 
RIPPLE Percentage increase in the store's wage bill, which results 
from increasing hourly wage of workers above the required 
minimum level (for those workers whose wage in March-
May is above mandated minimum), keeping hours constant;  
averaged for each store in March-May of each year author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
RIPPLEj,t = 1 + [(Σhi,j,t · Σ∆Wi,j,t – 
Σhi,j,t· Wi,j,t-1 ) / Σhi,j,t · Wj,t-1] , 
summed over workers i for whom Wi,j,t-1 
≥ MWt (in January-May) 
and set to 0 for workers for whom Wi,j,t-1 
< MWt (in January-May) 
 MWt Binary variable equal to 1 in August, 2007-January, 2008; 
August, 2008-Janry, 2009; and August, 2009-December, 
2009, respectivly 
author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
  GA Binary variable equal to 1 if establishment is located in 
Georgia 
   Sales Percentage change in monthly sales, converted to log points Restaurant owners confidential files Sales j,t =[Sales j,t-Sales j,t-1]/Sales j,t-1 log points 
Pop. Density County-level pulation density; number of people per square 
mile U.S. Census Bureau Population 
Estimates; available from 
http://www.census.gov/popest/count
ies/counties.html 
  Empl. Other County-level number of employees in private 
establishments, minus employment at Accommodations and 
Food Services and Retail sectors(NAICS 722) and at Retail 
sector (NAICS 44-45) 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Quarterly Census of Employment 
and Wages (QCEW); available from 
http://www.bls.gov/cew/home.htm. 
 
log 
County f.e. County fixed effects; binary varialbe equal to 1 if a 
restaurant is located in a given county author calculation based on GSP 
mapping of store's locations 
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Owner f.e. Owner fixed effects; binary variable equal to 1 if a 
restaurant belongs to one of the three franchisers 
author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
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Table 7. Employment level changes during MW increase periods, with and without 
 store, county, and owner and fixed effects 
 Jan‘07- Jan‘08- Jan‘09- Jan‘07- Jan‘08- Jan‘09- Jan‘07- Jan‘08- Jan‘09- Jan‘07- Jan‘08- Jan‘09- 
 Jan‘08 Jan‘09 Dec‘09 Jan‘08 Jan‘09 Dec‘09 Jan‘08 Jan‘09 Dec‘09 Jan‘08 Jan‘09 Dec‘09 
MW1 -0.018   -0.007   -0.006   -0.006   
 (0.012)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   
MW2  -0.033***   -0.033***   -0.033***   -0.033***  
  (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)  
MW3   0.006   0.006   0.006   0.006 
   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007) 
Store F.E. NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
County 
F.E. 
NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Owner F.E. NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
             
N 2029 2104 1940 2029 2104 1940 2029 2104 1940 2029 2104 1940 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.74 0.79 0.82 0.74 0.79 0.82 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered on establishments. The dependent variable in all regressions is store-level log of bi-weekly employment. 1
st
 MW is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for the 6 months after July 2007 MW increase (August, 2007-January, 2008). 2
nd
 MW is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 6 
months after July 2008 MW increase (August, 2008-January, 2009). 3
rd
 MW is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the 5 months after July 2009 increase (August, 
2009-December, 2009).  
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Table 8A. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st
 MW increase: Contemporaneous and lagged 
sales, January, 2007-January, 2008 
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours lnHours lnHours 
lnGAP1*MW1 0.392 0.374 0.251 0.194 0.360 0.243 0.193 0.310 0.178 0.139 0.361 0.265 0.366 
 (0.465) (0.469) (0.490) (0.503) (0.469) (0.489) (0.502) (0.459) (0.477) (0.490) (0.305) (0.334) (0.376) 
lnGAP1 1.965 1.976 2.026 1.888 1.983 2.030 1.889 2.006 2.062 1.918 0.228 0.225 0.143 
 (1.920) (1.917) (1.945) (1.993) (1.919) (1.947) (1.995) (1.916) (1.943) (1.992) (1.471) (1.489) (1.508) 
MW1 -0.014 -0.013 -0.016 -0.018 -0.013 -0.015 -0.018 -0.010 -0.012 -0.016 -0.004 -0.012 -0.020 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Sales (log)  0.090*** 0.060 0.023 0.089*** 0.060 0.024 0.083*** 0.068 0.018 0.193*** 0.187*** 0.037 
  (0.031) (0.046) (0.034) (0.031) (0.046) (0.034) (0.030) (0.048) (0.034) (0.035) (0.052) (0.027) 
Pop. density        -0.001 -0.001* -0.001    
        (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Emp. Priv(log)      0.073 0.072 0.080       
     (0.161) (0.153) (0.153)       
County F. E. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Owner F. E.  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sales lag? N/A No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths 
N 2013 2001 1843 1685 2001 1843 1685 2001 1843 1685 2001 1843 1685 
R
2
 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.64 0.75 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. MW1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August, 2007-January, 2008.  The 
dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the average bi-weekly employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate 
hours, which is equal to the total hours=regular +overtime (logged); Sales is the log of monthly percent change in sales, with no lag, and also lagged one 
and two months . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
Table 8B. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st
 MW increase: Contemporaneous and lagged 
sales, January, 2008-January, 2009 
 
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours lnHours lnHours 
lnGAP2*MW2 -0.246 -0.262 -0.267 -0.277 -0.211 -0.216 -0.227 -0.354 -0.376 -0.359 0.160 0.155 0.153 
 (0.353) (0.353) (0.352) (0.350) (0.352) (0.351) (0.349) (0.345) (0.343) (0.344) (0.166) (0.165) (0.164) 
lnGAP2 0.552 0.540 0.527 0.524 0.517 0.504 0.501 0.582 0.577 0.562 -0.445 -0.463 -0.467 
 (2.046) (2.045) (2.045) (2.044) (2.047) (2.046) (2.045) (2.048) (2.047) (2.046) (1.325) (1.322) (1.323) 
MW2 -0.022 -0.020 -0.019 -0.015 -0.018 -0.017 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -
0.044*** 
-0.044*** -0.041*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Sales (log)  0.042 0.028 0.122*** 0.047 0.026 0.116*** 0.034 0.053 0.109*** 0.098*** 0.125*** 0.077*** 
  (0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) 
Pop. density        -
0.002** 
-0.002*** -0.001**    
        (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Emp. riv(log)     0.085 0.094 0.075       
     (0.075) (0.077) (0.074)       
County F. E. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Owner F. E.  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sales lag? N/A No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths 
Observations 2,104 2,102 2,100 2,098 2,102 2,100 2,098 2,102 2,100 2,098 2102 2100 2098 
R-squared 0.786 0.788 0.788 0.789 0.789 0.790 0.790 0.788 0.789 0.789 0.75 0.75 0.75 
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Table 8C. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st
 MW increase: Contemporaneous and lagged 
sales, January, 2009-December, 2009 
 
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours lnHours lnHours 
lnGAP3*MW3 0.626** 0.623** 0.627** 0.615** 0.624** 0.627** 0.617** 0.623** 0.627** 0.615** 0.360** 0.349** 0.366** 
 (0.291) (0.292) (0.291) (0.291) (0.288) (0.286) (0.287) (0.292) (0.291) (0.291) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) 
lnGAP3 -1.063 -1.064 -1.063 -1.062 -1.064 -1.064 -1.062 -1.064 -1.063 -1.062 -0.488 -0.484 -0.485 
 (1.547) (1.548) (1.547) (1.546) (1.548) (1.548) (1.546) (1.548) (1.547) (1.546) (1.050) (1.050) (1.049) 
MW3 -0.035* -0.035* -0.035* -0.034* -0.038* -0.038* -0.037* -0.035* -0.035* -0.034* -0.021* -0.018 -0.021 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Sales (log)  0.033 -0.010 0.073** 0.031 -0.007 0.072** 0.033 -0.010 0.073** 0.135*** 0.171*** 0.035 
  (0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) (0.035) (0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.046) (0.025) (0.034) 
Pop. density        -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*    
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Emp. Priv(log)     -0.128 -0.129 -0.125       
     (0.169) (0.170) (0.165)       
County F. E. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Owner F. E.  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sales lag? N/A No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths No lag 1 mth 2 mths 
Observations 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1,940 1,940 1,940 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.76 0.76 0.75 
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Table 9A. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st 
 MW 
increase: Preferred specification, January, 2007-January, 2008 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP1*MW1 0.194 0.193 0.139 0.265 
 (0.503) (0.502) (0.490) (0.334) 
lnGAP1 1.888 1.889 1.918 0.225 
 (1.993) (1.995) (1.992) (1.489) 
MW1 -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 -0.012 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) 
l. sales (log) 0.023 0.024 0.018 0.187*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.052) 
Pop.density   -0.001  
   (0.001)  
Emp. Priv  0.080   
(log)  (0.153)   
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,685 1,685 1,685 1,843 
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.64 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. MW2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in August, 2007-January, 2008.  The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the average bi-weekly 
employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the 
total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, 
lagged 1 month). 
 
Table 9B. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 2
nd
 MW 
increase: Preferred specification, January, 2008-January, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP2*MW2 -0.202 -0.155 -0.280 0.159 
 (0.405) (0.405) (0.400) (0.210) 
lnGAP1 0.123 0.110 0.143 -1.176 
 (1.978) (1.981) (1.976) (1.203) 
MW2 -0.017 -0.015 -0.011 -0.042*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.010) 
l. sales (log) 0.124*** 0.118*** 0.111*** 0.125*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.026) 
Emp.Priv.  0.076   
(log)  (0.073)   
Pop. Dens.   -0.001**  
   (0.001)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,054 2,054 2,054 2,054 
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.75 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. MW2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in August, 2008-January, 2009.  The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the average bi-weekly 
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employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the 
total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, 
lagged 1 month). 
Table 9C. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 2
nd
 MW 
increase: Preferred specification, January, 2009-December, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP3*MW3 0.454 0.456 0.454 0.312 
 (0.397) (0.396) (0.397) (0.277) 
lnGAP1 -0.610 -0.610 -0.610 -1.051 
 (1.570) (1.571) (1.570) (1.192) 
MW3 -0.024 -0.027 -0.024 -0.016 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) 
l. sales (log) 0.076** 0.074** 0.076** 0.175*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.025) 
Emp.Priv.  -0.116   
(log)  (0.160)   
Pop. Dens.   -0.000  
   (0.000)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,892 1,892 1,892 1,892 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.76 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. MW2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in August, 2009-December, 2009.  The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the average bi-weekly 
employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the 
total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, 
lagged 1 month). 
Table 10. Summary statistics: Ripple effect 
Year Ripple Mean St. dev. Min Max N of obs. 
2007 Ripple1 1.990 1.100 0 5.711 2013 
2008 Ripple 2 1.444 1.383 0 10.700 2104 
2009 Ripple 3 0.448 0.680 0 3.851 1940 
Notes: Table 12  shows summary statistics the  Ripple effect, calculated as an average percent of wage bill increase 
due to pay increases for worker for whom MW increase was non-binding (in March-May of each year). Number of 
observations are establishment-level, pay-period, for Jan.2007-Jan2008; Jan 2008-Jan2009, and Jan 2009-Dec.2009.   
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Table 11A. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st 
 MW 
increase: Exploring the ripple effect, January, 2007-January, 2008 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnUGAP1*MW1 -0.069 -0.080 -0.141 0.627 
 (0.694) (0.693) (0.689) (0.521) 
lnUGAP1 -0.091 -0.084 -0.061 -0.183 
 (2.154) (2.155) (2.148) (1.414) 
MW1 -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 -0.033 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.026) 
l. sales (log) 0.023 0.023 0.017 0.188*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.052) 
Emp.Priv.  0.074   
(log)  (0.151)   
Pop.dens.   -0.001  
   (0.001)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
N 1,685 1,685 1,685 1,843 
R
2
 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.64 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. MW1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in August, 2007-January, 2008.  The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the log of the average bi-weekly 
employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the 
total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); UGAP is the upper bound for GAP, which is equal to the sum of GAP 
variable and the ripple effect (percent increase in the wage bill due to wage increases that are not due to the 
MW hikes);  l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
Table 11B. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st 
 MW 
increase: Exploring the ripple effect, January, 2008-January, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnUGAP2*MW2 0.141 0.158 0.073 0.162 
 (0.505) (0.505) (0.502) (0.306) 
lnUGAP1 -1.893 -1.896 -1.886 -0.680 
 (1.792) (1.793) (1.792) (1.358) 
MW2 -0.034 -0.032 -0.029 -0.044** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.019) 
l. sales (log) 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.124*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.026) 
Emp.Priv.  0.078   
(log)  (0.073)   
Pop.dens.   -0.001**  
   (0.001)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,054 2,054 2,054 2,054 
R-squared 0.790 0.792 0.791 0.747 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. MW1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in August, 2008-January, 2009.  The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the log of the average bi-weekly 
employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the 
total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); UGAP is the upper bound for GAP, which is equal to the sum of GAP 
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variable and the ripple effect (percent increase in the wage bill due to wage increases that are not due to the 
MW hikes);  l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
 
Table 11C. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st 
 MW 
increase: Exploring the ripple effect, January, 2009-December, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnUGAP3*MW3 0.188 0.194 0.188 0.196 
 (0.497) (0.498) (0.497) (0.378) 
lnUGAP1 -3.597* -3.596* -3.597* -1.237 
 (2.033) (2.034) (2.033) (1.322) 
MW3 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.027) 
l. sales (log) 0.074** 0.073** 0.074** 0.174*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) 
Emp.Priv.  -0.119   
(log)  (0.159)   
Pop.dens.   -0.000**  
   (0.000)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,892 1,892 1,892 1,892 
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.76 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. MW1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
in August, 2009-December, 2009.  The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the log of the average bi-weekly 
employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the 
total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); UGAP is the upper bound for GAP, which is equal to the sum of GAP 
variable and the ripple effect (percent increase in the wage bill due to wage increases that are not due to the 
MW hikes);  l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
 
Table 12. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours: Effect of 
Longer Hours Mandate, January, 2008-January, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
NOEXP*lnGAP2* -0.627 -0.518 -0.600 -0.859 
MW2 (1.022) (1.003) (1.020) (0.689) 
lnGAP2*MW2 0.189 0.200 0.104 0.679* 
 (0.639) (0.641) (0.641) (0.375) 
lnGAP1 0.530 0.504 0.543 -0.621 
 (1.867) (1.865) (1.865) (1.100) 
MW2 -0.051 -0.049 -0.045 -0.080*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.020) 
l. sales (log) 0.121*** 0.114*** 0.109*** 0.124*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.025) 
Emp. Priv.  0.085   
(log)  (0.073)   
Pop. Dens.   -0.001**  
   (0.001)  
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County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2054 2054 2054 2054 
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.7 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. NOEXP is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a store did not receive an exemption from the longer operating hours mandate; MW2 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 in August, 2008-January, 2009.  The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the log of the average bi-weekly 
employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the total 
hours=regular +overtime (logged). Included in the regression but not shown are: dummy variable for not being in 
the exempt group of stores, as well as two-way interaction variables (dummy for being exempt, interacted with MW2 
and lnGAP2 interacted with dummy for being exempt); l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last 
column, lagged 1 month). 
 
Table 13A. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st 
 MW 
increase: One franchise owner, January, 2007-January, 2008 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP1*MW1 -0.351 -0.343 -0.316 -0.375 
 (0.531) (0.532) (0.535) (0.293) 
lnGAP1 2.149 2.144 2.130 0.510 
 (1.969) (1.968) (1.967) (1.494) 
MW1 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.013 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) 
l. sales (log) 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.200*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.057) 
Pop.density  -0.087   
  (0.176)   
Emp. Priv   0.004  
(log)   (0.002)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1337 1337 1337 1459 
R-squared 0.391 0.391 0.391 0.345 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. Equations are estimated for sub-
sample of restaurants owned by a single franchise owner. MW1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August, 2007-
January, 2008.  The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the average bi-weekly employment; the 
dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the total hours=regular 
+overtime  (logged); l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
 
Table 13B. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 2
nd
 MW 
increase: One franchise owner, January, 2008-January, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP2*MW2 -0.717 -0.707 -0.718 -0.004 
 (0.577) (0.576) (0.574) (0.370) 
lnGAP1 0.255 0.252 0.255 -1.136 
 (1.963) (1.965) (1.963) (1.200) 
MW2 0.015 0.017 0.017 -0.026 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.020) 
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l. sales (log) 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.105** 0.128*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.026) 
Emp.Priv.  0.090   
(log)  (0.079)   
Pop. Dens.   -0.004***  
   (0.001)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1586 1586 1586 1586 
R-squared 0.434 0.435 0.436 0.505 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. Equations are estimated for sub-
sample of restaurants owned by a single franchise owner.MW2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August, 2008-
January, 2009.  The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the average bi-weekly employment; the 
dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the total hours=regular 
+overtime  (logged); l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
Table 13C. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 2
nd
 MW 
increase: One franchise owner, January, 2009-December, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP3*MW3 -0.285 -0.298 -0.285 0.192 
 (0.857) (0.860) (0.857) (0.580) 
lnGAP1 -0.540 -0.538 -0.540 -1.043 
 (1.562) (1.562) (1.562) (1.194) 
MW3 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.001 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.043) 
l. sales (log) 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.175*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.031) 
Emp.Priv.  -0.073   
(log)  (0.153)   
Pop. Dens.   -0.000  
   (0.000)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1464 1464 1464 1464 
R-squared 0.421 0.422 0.421 0.474 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. Equations are estimated for sub-
sample of restaurants owned by a single franchise owner.MW3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August, 2009-
December, 2009.  The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the average bi-weekly employment; the 
dependent variable in the last column is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the total hours=regular 
+overtime  (logged); l.sales is the log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
 
Table 14A. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 1
st 
 MW 
increase: Exclude Atlanta Metro Area, January, 2007-January, 2008 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP1*MW1 -0.183 -0.186 -0.157 -0.309 
 (0.454) (0.455) (0.457) (0.266) 
lnGAP1 2.093 2.095 2.079 0.511 
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 (1.982) (1.984) (1.981) (1.486) 
MW1 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 0.012 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) 
l. sales (log) 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.195*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.055) 
Pop.density  0.075   
  (0.154)   
Emp. Priv   0.003  
(log)   (0.002)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1457 1457 1457 1591 
R-squared 0.420 0.421 0.420 0.488 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. Sample excludes stores located in 
Atlanta Metro Area. MW1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August, 2007-January, 2008.  The dependent variable 
in columns 1-3 is the log of the average bi-weekly employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the 
log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); l.sales is the log of 
monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
 
Table 14B. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 2
nd
 MW 
increase: Exclude Atlanta Metro Area, January, 2008-January, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP2*MW2 -0.809 -0.760 -0.812 -0.169 
 (0.536) (0.536) (0.534) (0.359) 
lnGAP1 0.280 0.267 0.280 -1.090 
 (1.960) (1.963) (1.960) (1.196) 
MW2 0.019 0.019 0.022 -0.022 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) 
l. sales (log) 0.120*** 0.113*** 0.105** 0.137*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.026) 
Emp.Priv.  0.033   
(log)  (0.069)   
Pop. Dens.   -0.004***  
   (0.001)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1742 1742 1742 1742 
R-squared 0.469 0.473 0.470 0.604 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. Sample excludes stores located in 
Atlanta Metro Area. MW2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August, 2008-January, 2009.  The dependent variable 
in columns 1-3 is the log of the average bi-weekly employment; the dependent variable in the last column is the 
log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); l.sales is the log of 
monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
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Table 14C. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours, 2
nd
 MW 
increase: Exclude Atlanta Metro Area, January, 2009-December, 2009 
     
 lnEmp lnEmp lnEmp lnHours 
lnGAP3*MW3 0.293 0.280 0.293 0.553 
 (0.834) (0.830) (0.834) (0.583) 
lnGAP1 -0.590 -0.589 -0.590 -1.080 
 (1.570) (1.570) (1.570) (1.199) 
MW3 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.033 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.044) 
l. sales (log) 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.192*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.027) 
Emp.Priv.  -0.112   
(log)  (0.161)   
Pop. Dens.   -0.000  
   (0.000)  
County f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Owner f.e. YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,892 1,892 1,892 1,892 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.76 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. Sample excludes stores located in 
Atlanta Metro Area. MW3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August, 2009-December, 2009.  The dependent 
variable in columns 1-3is the log of the average bi-weekly employment; the dependent variable in the last column 
is the log of the aggregate hours, which is equal to the total hours=regular +overtime  (logged); l.sales is the 
log of monthly sales, lagged 2 months (last column, lagged 1 month). 
Table 15. Cumulative effect of 3 Federal MW increases: January, 2007 – December, 2009 
 
ln(Emp) ln(Hours) 
GAP 0.756 0.706* 
 
(0.522) (0.370) 
MW -0.067 -0.100* 
 
(0.078) (0.056) 
Store F.E. yes yes 
Owner F.E. yes yes 
N 148 148 
R
2
 0.89 0.89 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. GAP is defined as: 
ΣGAP=GAP1+GAP2+GAP3 for each establishment in t=2 (December 2009) and 0 otherwise 
(January 2007); the dependent variable in columns 1 (2)  is the log of the average monthly employment  (log of 
the aggregate hours) in Jan. 2007 and Dec. 2009; MW is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t=2 (December 2009). 
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Table 16. Summary of the Main Menu Item Price Increases: January 2007 – December 2009 
year month 
Owner 
―type‖ 
average initial 
price ($) 
average %  
increase 
average $ 
increase 
% increase in 
wage bill 
2007 
August I 4.35 2.30% 0.10 1.73% 
July II 4.50 2.20% 0.10 10.88% 
November III 3.80 5.26% 0.20 4.98% 
       
2008 
May I 4.44 4.50% 0.20  
June I 4.65 4.30% 0.20 2% 
August I 4.76 2.10% 0.10  
July II 4.60 2.17% 0.10 9.18% 
June III 4.00 2.50% 0.10 7.74% 
       
2009 
No increase I -- -- -- 4.15% 
No increase II -- -- -- 7.68% 
April III 4.10 2.44% 0.10 8.50% 
November III 4.20 4.52% 0.19  
Notes: The main menu meal includes a combo (sandwich, small fries and a drink). Percent increase in payroll costs 
for each owner is based on the average hours (and overtime hours), fixed in the first half January, 2007, and the 
average wages in the first half of January, 2008; January, 2009; and December, 2009. 
Table 18.  Average Wage Increases: Descriptive statistics for ―Affected‖ and ―Unaffected‖ 
workers 
MW "Affected" workers "Unaffected" workers 
1st MW  
0.218 
(.152) 
0.168 
(.2098) 
   
2nd MW 
0.362 
(.2584) 
0.231 
(.3173) 
   
3rd MW 
0.650 
(.1866) 
0.231 
(.2738) 
Notes: Sub-sample ―affected‖ workers includes those workers whose hourly wages in January-May of each year 
were less than the upcoming July minimum wage; sub-sample ―unaffected‖ workers are those for whom MW is non-
binding in a given year (prior to the MW increase).  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 17. Maximum likelihood estimates of the survival-time models: Weibull and semi-
parametric Cox model (Hazard ratios) 
 Weibull Cox 
   
Hourly wage -0.691*** -0.703*** 
 (0.019) (0.002) 
Reg. hours -0.986*** -0.987*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
lnGAP -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
lnEmpl. 1.289*** 1.277*** 
 (0.093) (0.087) 
107 
 
 
Store F.E. Yes Yes 
Owner F.E. Yes Yes 
N 183,116 183,116 
p 1.27 … 
1/p 0.79 … 
Clusters 81 81 
Notes: Hazard rations are presented from estimating parametric survival-time model (under the assumption of 
Weibull distribution) and the semi-parametric Cox model. The duration of spells is defined as the number of 
consecutive pay periods a worker is observed in the sample, at the same store; the shortest spells (appearing in the 
sample only once) are ignored. Robust standard errors clustered on establishments are in parentheses. Also included 
but not shown are monthly sales variable (in log form), as well as store and owner fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 19.  Descriptive statistics, Manager Survey 
Variable Mean St.dev. Min Max N 
MW increase and cost-saving measures: 
     Total weekly payroll increase due to the MW 1118.19 1120.16 200 8000 57 
Percent of the increase offset (through non-
employment cost-savings measures) 22.86 21.83 2 100 60 
Store and workforce characteristics: 
     Number of applicants a month 51.26 48.41 3 300 65 
Days to fill in new position 4.41 3.84 1 18 64 
Percent of EEs underqualified 23.65 18.48 1 75 54 
Percent of EEs overqualified 38.62 23.31 0 90 60 
MGR experience: 
     Tenure at this store (in months) 43.84 40.58 1 158 61 
Tenure as a manager (in years) 10.57 9.11 0 49 62 
MGR attitude to MW increase: 
     How big of a worry is the MW increase? 
(distribution of answers) 4.5 2.73 1 10 64 
No or little worry (1-3) 40.63 26 
   Some worry (4-7) 42.19 27 
   Big or very big worry (8-10) 17.19 11 
   How big the effect of MW on sales? (distribution 
of answers) 4.37 2.44 1 10 65 
Stay the same or change very little 43.08 28 
   Decrease somewhat 46.15 30 
   Decrease significantly 10.77 7 
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Table 20. Business adjustments used to offset payroll costs 
Area Cost-saving adjustments: 
Share of MGRs 
making adjustment 
N 
H
u
m
an
 R
es
o
u
rc
e 
 P
ra
ct
ic
es
 
Reduce training  10.61 66 
Change work schedules 69.23 65 
Hire older/more experienced workers 50 66 
Hire teenage workers 15.15 66 
Schedule more full-time employees and less part-time 21.21 66 
Schedule more part-time employees and less full-time  27.69 65 
Postpone or limit pay raises to your more experienced 
workers 42.42 66 
Increase performance standards 90.91 66 
Reduce the number of people on your payroll  19.7 66 
Cut weekly hours of some employees 62.12 66 
 
   
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 E
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
 
an
d
 P
ro
d
u
ct
iv
it
y
 
Cross-train workers for multitasking 83.33 66 
Expand job duties of your workers 86.15 65 
Discourage overtime work 81.54 65 
Tighten-up on absenteeism and discipline 80.3 66 
Get more work from each person 89.39 66 
Increase morale and team spirit 92.42 66 
Rearrange production operation to be more efficient 62.12 66 
 
   Non-labor 
costs/Customer 
service 
Less time spent on  clean up 12.12 66 
Reduce food waste in preparation/storage 96.97 66 
Reduce or save water and electricity usage 93.94 66 
Reduce amount of condiments and "extras" given to 
customers 54.55 66 
   New ways to improve customer service 84.85 66 
More outreach to church, school and community groups 49.23 66 
 
Notes: Table 20 shows summary statistics for Question 7 in the MGR survey. Specifically, each manager was asked 
to following question: ―Other research studies of the minimum wage have identified the following list of items as 
BUSINESS ADJUSTMENTS you might possible make in order to OFFSET the payroll cost increase associated 
with the higher minimum wage. Which of the following are you planning to do in the next 1-3 months OR have 
done already in the last month (please check YES or NO)?‖ 
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Table 21. Channels of adjustment: employee perspective, summary statistics 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of workers‘ responses to the following question ―The U.S. minimum 
wage (the lowest wage a company can legally pay) is currently $6.25 per hour. In July, 2009, it is going up to $7.25. 
Listed below are some adjustments your restaurant owner and manger might make because of this increase in labor 
cost. Tell us what you expect to happen (No=will not happen; YES=will happen)‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Channels of adjustment N Mean 
St. 
dev. 
Menu prices go up 1608 0.87 0.34 
Some people weekly work hours get cut back 1610 0.82 0.38 
Employees have to work harder and faster 1598 0.74 0.44 
At least one person's job get eliminated 1596 0.43 0.5 
The amount of training offered gets cut back 1582 0.36 0.48 
Benefits, like insurance and meal discounts, get cut back 1595 0.33 0.47 
The managers have to work harder and find ways to be more 
efficient 1593 0.73 0.44 
People's job duties increase to include more tasks 1599 0.71 0.45 
Managers tighten up on rules like missing work and taking 
breaks 1602 0.77 0.42 
Customer services goes down 1604 0.3 0.47 
Managers try to increase team spirit and workers' happiness 1603 0.71 0.45 
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